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study	 is	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 research	 project	 ‘Reason	 of	 state’	 or	 ‘reason	 of	 princes’?	 The	 ‘new	
monarchy	 and	 its	 opponents	 in	 France,	 Germany	 and	 the	 Netherlands,	 during	 the	 seventeenth	
century	 (2011‐2016).	 The	 research	 was	 supervised	 by	 prof.	 dr.	 R.C.F.	 von	 Friedeburg	 and	
comprised	four	projects	of	which	the	present	study	is	one.	Ingmar	Vroomen	examined	the	use	of	
fatherland	 rhetoric	 in	 Dutch	 pamphlets	 (1618‐1672)	 as	 a	 response	 to	 foreign	 threats	 and	
internal	strife.	Annemieke	Romein	studied	the	employment	of	fatherland‐terminology	in	estate	
debates	 in	 Jülich	 and	 Hesse‐Cassel	 between	 1642‐1655,	 and	 in	 Brittany	 France	 in	 the	 period	









A	 common	 view	 among	 historians	 has	 been	 that	 in	 there	 was	 a	 disintegration	 of	 the	 late	
medieval	and	renaissance	regimen	politicum	et	regale,	based	on	Christian	humanism,	rule	of	law	
(divine,	divinely	natural	and	partly	positive),	and	on	virtue	essentially	based	on	Christianity,	as	
illustrated	 by	 Erasmus’	 Institutio	 principis	 christiani	 (1516);	 and	 that	 in	 its	 place	 arose	 the	
polarities	 of	 absolutism	 and	 republicanism,	 with	 France	 and	 Spain	 versus	 England	 and	 the	
Netherlands	 as	 foremost	 examples.1	 This	 view	 has	 slowly	 collapsed:	 the	 historiographical	
concept	of	absolutism	has	been	rather	eroded	or	demythicized,	at	least	in	the	sense	of	a	monarch	
being	 free	 from	 law–	Louis	 XIV	 scrupulously	 followed	positive	 law	 and	 ruled	with	 consent	 or	
consultation	of	the	Estates	and	parlements;2	and	recently	the	notion	of	republicanism	has	been	
challenged	 –Helmer	 Helmers	 has	 convincingly	 argued	 that	 the	 Dutch	 were	 full‐heartedly	
‘Royalist	Republicans’	 after	 the	 execution	 of	 Charles	 I;	 or	 it	 has	 been	qualified	 as	 entailing	 by	





2	 See	 for	 instance	Robert	 von	Friedeburg	 and	 John	Morrill	 (eds.),	Monarchy	 transformed:	princes	and	 their	elites	 in	
early	modern	Western	Europe	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2017,	forthcoming),	in	particular	introduction	
and	 conclusion;	 Nicholas	 Henshall,	 The	 Myth	 Of	 Absolutism:	 Change	 And	 Continuity	 In	 Early	 Modern	 European	
Monarchy	 (London:	 Longmann,	 1992);	 Ronald	 G.	 Asch	 and	Heinz	 Duchhardt	 (eds.),	Der	Absolutismus‐‐ein	Mythos?:	
Strukturwandel	 monarchischer	 Herrschaft	 in	 West‐	 und	 Mitteleuropa	 (ca.	 1550‐1700)	 (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna:	
Bölhau,	1996);	Johan	Sommerville,	‘Early	Modern	Absolutism’,	in	Cesare	Cuttica	and	Glenn	Burgess	(eds.),	Monarchism	
and	 Absolutism	 in	 Early	Modern	 Europe	 (London:	 Pickering	 and	 Chatto,	 2012),	 117‐130.	 Sommerville	 (re)defines	
absolutist	 political	 thought	 in	 line	 with	 revisionist	 socio‐economic	 historical	 research	 as	 a	 model	 of	 ‘social	
collaboration’	between	the	Crown	and	its	elites.		
3	Helmer	Helmers,	The	Royalist	Republic.	Literature,	Politics,	and	Religion	in	the	Anglo‐Dutch	Public	Sphere,	1639–1660	
(Cambridge:	 Cambridge	University	 Press,	 2015).	Helmers	 persuasively	 explained	 the	 staunch	 support	 amongst	 the	
Dutch	 for	 Stuart	 royalism	 under	 the	 ‘republican’	 (stadholderless)	 regime	 of	 1650‐1672	 after	 the	 regicide;	 Patrick	
Collinson	has	stressed	the	republican	character	(high	level	of	social	collaboration	between	Crown	and	its	elites)	of	the	
English	 monarchy	 for	 Elizabethan	 England.	 Patrick	 Collinson,	 ‘The	 Monarchical	 Republic	 of	 Queen	 Elizabeth	 I’,	 in	
Bulletin	 of	 the	 John	 Rylands	 Library	 LXIX	 (1987),	 394‐424.	 Mark	 Goldie	 stressed	 this	 republican	 character	 of	 the	
English	 monarchy	 on	 a	 more	 general	 level.	 Mark	 Goldie,	 ‘The	 Unacknowledged	 Republic:	 Officeholding	 in	 Early	
Modern	England’,	 in	Tim	Harris	(ed.),	The	Politics	of	the	Excluded,	c.1500‐1850	(London:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2001),	
153‐194.	See	Sommerville’s	critical	remark	on	the	overlapping	definition	of	republicanism	and	absolutism	in	terms	of	
the	 social	 collaboration	 model.	 Sommerville,	 ‘Early	 Modern	 Absolutism’,	 118‐119.	 See	 also	 in	 the	 same	 volume	
Michael	 J.	 Seidler’s	 comment	 that	 the	 contestation	 of	 ‘absolutism’	 as	 political	 language	 ‘has	 also	 undermined	 the	
counterpart	 language	 of	 “democracy”	 or	 “republicanism”	 (…)	 the	 opposition	 assumed	 in	 such	 discussions	 is	












Montesquieu	 is	 perceived	 as	 monarchy	 constrained	 by	 law	 rather	 than	 absolutism	 or	
republicanism.4	Perhaps	we	should	keep	in	mind	that	early	modern	Europeans	shared	a	much	
broader	consensus	about	 the	necessity	of	 the	accountability	of	government	 than	 the	notion	of	
‘republicanism’	 as	 a	 subversive	 ideology	 suggests,	 so	 helping	 to	 create	 an	 exaggerated	
dichotomy	between	it	and	the	concept	of	‘absolutism’.	The	ruptures	in	confessional	Christianity	
of	the	Reformation	and	the	growing	scale	of	European	warfare	brought	forth	a	perceived	crisis	
of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 beyond	modern	 ideological	 divisions.	 Authors	 struggled	 to	 reconstruct	 and	
defend	 a	 rule	 of	 law,	 while	 its	 own	 basis,	 confessional	 Christianity	 and	 Aristotle,	 slowly	
dissolved.		






perceived	 crisis,	 both	 national	 and	 ‘international’,	 secular	 as	 well	 as	 religious.	 Through	 the	
subsequent	 use	 of	 Rohan	 and	 the	 employment	 of	 his	 vocabulary	 of	 interest	 we	 can	 see	
something	of	the	ingenuity	of	argument	under	direct	pressures.	The	result	was	both	to	establish	
Rohan	as	an	authority,	providing	a	seminal	and	persuasively	 inescapable	 text	 that	shaped	and	
constrained	argument;	and	as	resource	for	adaptation.	In	all	the	cases	discussed	and	cohered	by	
reference	 to	Rohan,	 the	 stimulus	 to	 argument	was	 a	 sense	 of	 immediate	 and	dire	 threat,	 best	












4	 Seidler,	 “Monstrous”	 Pufendorf’;	 Paul	 A.	 Rahe,	 Montesquieu	 and	 the	 Logic	 of	 Liberty:	 War,	 Religion,	 Commerce,	




de	Lisola,	who	 turned	 the	 force	of	argument	against	France.	The	notions	of	 interest,	 reason	of	
state	and	predatory	monarchy	could	be	given	different,	even	opposing	content,	as	is	clear	from	
the	 contrasts	 between	 Rohan	 and	 Lisola,	 the	 Dutch	 authors	 Pieter	 de	 la	 Court	 and	 Petrus	
Valkenier.5		





could	be	 reformulated	will	 be	discussed	more	below.	 Immediately,	 however,	 it	 should	be	 said	
that	it	provides	less	a	direct	context	than	a	background	for	this	study.	That	is,	the	texts	studied	
did	 not	 share	 a	 preoccupation	with	 a	 crisis	 in	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Rather,	 by	 their	 concern	with	
predatory	 monarchy,	 with	 arbitrary	 conduct	 and	 tyranny,	 that	 knows	 no	 boundaries,	 they	
presupposed	 the	existence	of	 laws	and	norms	 that	 could	be	violated	and	emphasised	 the	dire	
consequences	of	doing	so.	Thus	as	an	unintended	consequence	of	particular	and	even	opposing	
concerns	with	the	predatory,	they	helped	establish	a	space	in	which	attempts	to	reconceptualise	
the	rule	of	 law	could	be	played	out.	 In	other	words,	 the	general	picture	concerns	what	overall	







necessarily	 a	 conceptual	 content	with	which	we	 are	 familiar,	 not	 least	 the	 independence	 of	 a	
judiciary	 and	 an	 agreement	 on	 constitutional	 ground	 rules;	 it	 rather	 amounted	 to	 a	 variable	






Welvaren	 (Amsterdam:	 ‘Cyprianus	 van	 der	 Gracht’,	 1662);	 Petrus	 Valkenier,	 ‘t	 Verwerd	 Europa	 ofte	 politieke	 en	
historische	beschrijvinge	der	waare	fundamenten	en	oorzaken	van	de	oorlogen	en	revolutien	in	Europa	voornamentlijk	in	
en	 omtrent	 de	 Nederlanden	 zedert	 den	 jaare	 1664.	 Gecauseert	 door	 de	 gepretendeerde	 Universelen	 Monarchie	 der	
Franschen	(Amsterdam:	Hendrik	en	Dirk	Boom,	1675).	
6	See	 for	 instance	Martin	Krygier,	 ‘The	Rule	of	Law:	Legality,	Teleology,	Sociology’,	 in	Gianluigi	Palombella	and	Neil	
Walker	(eds.),	Relocating	the	Rule	of	Law	(Oxford:	Hart	Publishing,	2009),	45‐69.	Krygier	stresses	the	difference	with	a	
rule	by	law,	which	refers	to	political	power	exercised	by	legal	means,	but	requirements	of	the	rule	of	law	are	lacking;	




Roman	sources	and	 from	Roman	Law	a	divine	and	divinely	 inspired	natural	 law.	Although	the	
Fall	 obscured	 it	 to	 some	 extent,	 commentators	 such	 as	 Thomas	 Aquinas	 argued	 that	 God	
imprinted	on	mankind	virtues	and	knowledge	on	how	to	live	together	in	society.	All	men	had	to	
operate	 under	 divine	 natural	 law.	 During	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 sixteenth	 century	 scepticism	
arose	towards	the	extremely	broad	Aristotelian‐Christian	notion	of	the	rule	of	law,	of	rule	bound	
society.7	 From	 the	 late	 sixteenth	 up	 to	 the	 end	 of	 the	 seventeenth	 century	 incessant	warfare,	
confessional	 strife,	 civil	 wars	 and	 coercive	 princely	 politics	 gave	 rise	 to	 a	 perceived	 crisis	 of	




the	 last	 third	 of	 the	 seventeenth	 century	 onwards	 authors,	 such	 as	 Pierre	 Bayle,	 increasingly	
blamed	confessional	propaganda	and	clergy	(instead	of	political	actors)	for	the	strange	upsurge	
of	conflicts	and	civil	wars	from	the	1620	until	1650s.	Moreover,	contemporaries	more	and	more	
underlined	 the	danger	of	political	disintegration	under	 the	rising	burden	of	 taxation	and	debt,	
brought	forth	by	the	intensification	of	warfare.9	
The	picture	was	as	confused	as	it	was	enriched	through	the	printing	press,	but	Michael	
Stolleis	 has	 suggested	 a	 general	 trend	 that	 makes	 sense	 of	 much	 that	 was	 written:	 ‘As	 the	
foundations	 of	 Christianity	 were	 increasingly	 undermined	 in	 the	 sixteenth	 and	 seventeenth	
centuries	by	the	formation	of	different	confessions	and	by	successive	wars	of	religion,	so	too	did	
modern	 politics	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 determined	 by	 principalities	 become	 increasingly	
emancipated	from	prescribed	religious	content.’	He	observes	two	shifts	accordingly.	There	was	
an	 increasing	 stress	 on	 experience	 and	 observation	 to	 examine	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 political	
(temporal)	 world.	 The	 historical	 example	 functioned	 to	 determine	 natural	 law	 or	 to	 predict	
behaviour	 of	 political	 actors	 as	 in	 interest	 analyses.	 Second	 was	 ‘an	 erosion	 of	 the	 Christian	














9	 Heinz	 Schilling,	 ‘Confessional	 Europe’,	 in	 Thomas	 A.	 Brady,	 Heiko	 Augustinus	 Oberman,	 James	 D.	 Tracy	 (eds),	
Handbook	 of	European	history,	1400‐1600:	 late	Middle	Ages,	Renaissance,	and	Reformation,	Volume	2	 (Leiden:	 Brill,	
1995),	641‐682,	p.	667‐670;	Robert	von	Friedeburg,	‘How	"new"	is	the	"New	Monarchy"?’,	17‐30;	Michael	Sonenscher,	





law	 survived	 as	 a	 basic	 normative	 issue	 despite	 the	 breakdown	 of	 the	 major	 religious	
foundations	it	had	in	confessional	Christianity.	The	two	shifts	he	notes	are	certainly	pertinent	to	
the	writers	discussed	here.	They	do	put	faith	in	the	details	of	empirical	experience;	and	albeit	for	
very	 different	 reasons	marginalise	 confessional	 divisions.	 In	 the	 case	 of	Rohan,	 this	 has	 given	
rise	to	the	myth	of	objectivity	in	his	conception	of	interest;	 in	the	case	of	Petrus	Valkenier,	the	
distinction	between	the	universal	content	of	religion	from	institutionalised	confessions,	(derived	
very	much	 from	Hugo	 Grotius)	was	 a	means	 by	which	 he	 could	 assert	 a	 genuine	 piety	while	
isolating	religious	sects	as	part	of	a	crisis	of	order.	
At	different	 levels	of	 formality	writers	 in	 the	 late	seventeenth	century	were	concerned	
with	a	crisis	of	order,	more	or	less	systematically	focussing	on	conceptions	of	 law.	At	the	most	
sustained	 level	 of	 philosophical	 coherence	 Samuel	 Pufendorf	 remains	 the	 most	 significant.	
Pufendorf’s	natural	law	argument	was	a	consciously	laundered	version	of	Hobbes’s	arguments	in	
De	cive;	the	‘state’	as	legal	person	as	guardian	of	law	was	the	solution	to	disorder;	the	state	held	
undivided	 sovereignty	 and	 was	 likewise	 represented	 by	 the	 ruler.	 Unlike	 Hobbes,	 however,	
Pufendorf	stressed	the	faculty	of	a	peaceable	sociability	that	enables	humans	living	in	the	state	
of	nature	to	associate	and	establish	a	state	for	a	thorough	protection	of	life	and	property,	choose	
a	 form	 of	 government	 and	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 ruler,	 ‐a	 situation	 that	 could	 be	 reversed	 if	 the	
sovereign	 subverted	 the	 fundamental	 laws,	 or	 the	overriding	 purposes	 for	which	 society	was	
instituted.11	Pufendorf’s	 empirical‐historical	 analysis	of	 interest	of	Europe	 in	Einleitung	zu	der	
Historie	der	vornehmsten	Reiche	und	Staaten	so	 itziger	Zeit	 in	Europa	sich	befinden	(1682)	was	
rooted	 in	 his	 natural	 law	 theory.12	 Pufendorf	 stated	 that	 rulers	 had	 their	 (natural	 law)	







Skinner	 and	Martin	 van	 Gelderen	 (eds.),	Republicanism:	A	 Shared	European	Heritage.	Volume	 I,	Republicanism	 and	






law	 theory;	 ‘The	 latter	 is	 an	 internal,	 constitutive	matter	 involving	a	 state’s	 legitimate	 claim	 to	 sovereign	authority	
over	 its	members,	while	the	former	is	externally	oriented	and	concerns	the	effective	performance	of	 its	natural	 law	
obligations	 (particularly	 security)	 in	 an	 international	 context,	 on	which	 the	 claim	 to	 internal	 sovereignty	 rests.	 In	
short,	 a	 state’s	 raison	d’état	 is	 rooted	 in	 its	 raison	d’etre.’	Michael	 J.	 Seidler,	 ‘Introduction’	 to	Samuel	Pufendorf,	An	
Introduction	to	the	History	of	the	Principal	Kingdoms	and	States	of	Europe,	translated	by	Jocodus	Crull	(1695),	edited	
by	Michael	Seidler	(Indianapolis:	Liberty	Fund,	2013),	ix‐xl,	quoted	from	p.	xxxii	and	for	the	association	with	Valkenier	
p.	 xvii;	 See	 also	 Friedrich	Meinecke	 for	 the	 positioning	 of	 Petrus	 Valkenier’s	 ‘t	Verwerd	Europa	 in	 the	 tradition	 of	
Pufendorf’s	 interest	analysis	of	European	regimes.	Friedrich	Meinecke,	Machiavellism:	The	Doctrine	of	Raison	d’État	








predatory	 nature	 of	 the	 French	 monarchy	 that	 ruled	 a	 densely	 populated	 territory	 with	 a	
passionately	 warlike	 people	 given	 to	 robbery	 by	 conquest	 and	 threatened	 the	 survival	 of	




Perhaps	 because	 he	 did	 not	 pretend	 to	 the	 sort	 of	 philosophical	 coherence	we	 find	 in	
Pufendorf,	Valkenier	 offered	 his	 readers	 no	 explicit	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law;	 but	 he	 did	
share	 contemporary	 concerns	 for	 the	 consequences	 of	 expanded	 warfare	 and	 fractured	
confessional	 religion:	mob	 rule,	meddling	 priests,	 power‐hungry	 regents	 and	 plunder	 princes,	
for	 all	 of	 which	 the	 imperatives	 of	 divine	 law	 and	 the	 order	 that	 might	 stem	 from	 it	 was	
inadequate	protection.	For	Valkenier,	the	evocation	of	the	rule	of	law	was	a	means	of	combining	








to	 develop	 standing	 armies	 and	 administrations	 eventually	 leading	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	
modern	 bureaucratic	 tax	 states.	 This	 transformation	 was	 defined	 as	 early	 modern	 ‘state	
building’	in	which	rulers	built	up	their	state	apparatus	by	coercive	extraction	of	resources,	e.	g.	
through	taxation	of	their	unwilling	subjects	and	insubordinate	elites,	which	increased	the	ruler’s	
means	 to	 coerce	 them	even	more.	 15	Historians	have	 also	 claimed	 that	 the	 growing	use	of	 the	
                                                            
13	Pufendorf	thirdly	distinguished	between	a	private	and	public	interest	concerning	the	danger	of	the	pursuit	of	the	


















Since	 the	 1950s	 the	 received	 notion	 of	 ‘state	 building’	 as	 an	 intentional	 or	 strategic	
activity	 has	 come	 under	 question.18	 Institutionalised	 ‘states’	with	 self‐conscious	 knowledge	 of	
their	 ‘reason’	 did	 not	 develop.	 First,	 historians	 have	 increasingly	 stressed	 the	 heterogonous	
nature	 of	 European	 principalities.19	 John	 Morrill	 recently	 coined	 the	 term	 ‘dynastic	
agglomerates’	 to	 address	 that	 dynasties	 ruled	 over	multiple	 lands	with	 each	 polity	 having	 its	
own	 customs,	 laws	 and	 societal	 power	 structures.	Morrill	wants	 to	 underline	 particularly	 the	
unstable	nature	of	dynastic	rule	and	the	instability	of	how	these	agglomerates	were	formed	or	
rather	 collected	 by	 the	 ruling	 dynasties,	 and	 how	 they	 constantly	 changed	 form	 through	
marriage	 politics,	 warfare,	 and	 inheritance;	 the	 success	 of	 modern	 states	 should	 not	 be	





rulers’	 ‘foreign’	 policy	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 struggle	 over	 territories,	 resources	 and	 status.	
Therefore,	the	administration	of	the	different	agglomerates,	the	relation	with	the	local	elites,	was	
of	vital	 importance	 for	ruling	dynasties.	Moreover,	 the	number	of	members	of	 this	society	had	
                                                            
16	 As	 one	 of	 the	 first	modern	 historians,	 Friedrich	Meinecke	 addressed	 early	modern	 commentaries	 on	 ‘reason	 of	
state’	as	products	of	the	assumed	rise	of	the	modern	state.	Meinecke,	Machiavellism.	The	Doctrine	of	Raison	d’État,	1‐
22;	See	 for	 instance	William	F.	Church,	Richelieu	and	Reason	of	State,	 (Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1970),	






over	public	 institutions’.	Maurizio	Viroli,	From	Politics	 to	Reason	of	State.	The	Acquisition	and	Transformation	of	 the	
Language	of	Politics	1250–1600	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1992),	2‐3.	
18	 For	 an	 early	 commentary	 see	Kordula	Wolf,	 ‘Il	 X	Congresso	 Internazionale	di	 Scienze	 Storiche,	Roma,	 settembre	
1955.	 Un	 bilancio	 Storiografico,	 Convegno	 Internazionale’,	 accessed	 May	 7,	 2016,	 http://dhi‐
roma.it/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf‐dateien/Tagungsberichte/2005/tagung_1955.pdf.	
19Within	 the	historiography	a	 transition	 in	addressing	early	modern	polities	 is	observable,	 from	 	Richard	Bonney’s	
‘dynastic	states’,	via	John	Elliot’s	term	‘composite	monarchies’,	to	Morrills	‘dynastic	agglomerate’.	This	later	covers	the	
origins	 as	well	 as	 the	 nature	 of	 these	 polities:	 Richard	 Bonney,	The	European	Dynastic	 States,	 1494‐1660	 (Oxford:	
Oxford	University	 Press,	 1991);	 ‘Composite	monarchies’	was	 first	 formulated	 by	H.	 G.	 Koenigsberger	 in	 1975,	 see:	
John	H.	Elliott,	‘A	Europe	of	Composite	monarchies’,	Past	&	Present,	No.	137,	The	Cultural	and	Political	Construction	of	






decreased	 after	 the	1650s	 as	 the	European	military	 competition	 took	 its	 toll	 in	 respect	 of	 the	
defeat	of	many	small	polities	effectively	subjected	by	the	powerful	dynastic	agglomerates.22	
What	 is	 more,	 the	 true	 innovation	 brought	 forth	 by	 the	 growing	 scale	 of	 European	
conflict	 was	 governmental	 debt	 on	 an	 unprecedented	 scale,	 which	 consequently	 transformed	
monarchies	 into	war‐driven	 and	 debt‐ridden	 regimes.	 Since	 the	 1490s,	 European	 rulers	were	




new	 collaborations	 with	 old	 and	 new	 elites,	 which	 took	 up	 the	 financial	 restructuring	 ‐
government	became	increasingly	reliant	on	its	elites.	However,	these	new	resources	never	filled	
the	rapidly	growing	gaps	in	the	budgets	and	bankruptcy	was	a	recurring	issue	for	early	modern	




rule	 of	 law	 and	 endangering	 the	 rights	 and	 properties	 of	 the	 elites	 and	 subjects.23	 At	 last,	










The	 success	 of	 ‘reason	 of	 state’	 was	 indebted	 to	 the	 prior,	 European‐wide	 acceptance	 of	 the	
terminology	 of	 ‘state’.	 In	 the	 late	 fifteenth	 and	 early	 sixteenth	 century,	 Italian	 authors	 began	
                                                            
22	Von	Friedeburg,	'How	'new'	is	the	'New	Monarchy'?’,	22‐23;	Confessionalisation	contributed	to	politics	of	reason	of	
state,	 not	 chiefly	 in	 accordance	with	 dynastic	 interests,	 but	with	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 different	 agglomerates.	Heinz	
Schilling,	 Konfessionalisierung	 und	 Staatsinteressen.	 Internationale	 Beziehungen	 1559‐1660	 (Schöningh:	 Paderborn,	
2007).		
23	Von	Friedeburg	and	Morrill	(eds.),	Monarchy	transformed,	in	particular	introduction	and	conclusion.		









discussing	 the	 ways	 to	 maintain	 the	 ‘state’	 of	 the	 parvenu	 ‘new	 princes’	 such	 as	 the	 Medici,	
without	relying	on	more	 traditional	 idioms	of	 legitimation	provided	by	appeals	 to	civic	virtue.	
From	 the	1550s	 authors	 in	 Spain,	 France	 and	 the	United	Provinces	 and	England	 accepted	 the	
terminology	of	‘state’	in	all	its	ambiguous	range	of	meanings	from	princely	status	to	regime,	and	
would	adopt	the	terminology	of	reason	of	state	in	the	extraordinary	circumstances	of	religious	
civil	 strife	 from	 the	 end	 of	 the	 sixteenth	 century	 onwards.	Harro	Höpfl	 argues	 that	 ‘reason	of	
state’	became	part	of	the	‘vocabulary	of	fashionable	political	cynicism’	about	the	‘true’	motives	of	
rulers	spurred	by	the	experiences	of	religious	wars,	especially	in	the	Low	Countries	and	France.	
This	 vocabulary	 encompassed	 popular	 aphorisms	 and	 maxims	 such	 as	 necessitas	 non	 habet	
legem	 and	oderint	dum	metuant,	 and	was	 closely	 associated	with	 the	 terminology	 of	 ‘politics’	
(politics,	 policy,	 politica,	 politicus,	 politique),	 ‘statecraft’,	 ‘statism,	 ‘Machiavellism’,	 ‘interest	 of	
state’,	 the	 Tacitist	 term	 arcana	 imperii,	 ‘secrets’	 and	 ‘mysteries’.	 All	 these	 terms	 were	 fluidly	





was	 a	 highly	 suggestive	 term	 of	 art;	 and,	 therefore,	 it	 ought	 not	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 theory	 or	
concept.26		
Yet,	 exactly	 because	 of	 its	 opacity	 reason	 of	 state	 became	 fashionable.	 Reason	 of	 state	
was	employed	and	theorised	by	different,	mostly	Italian	authors	earlier	in	the	sixteenth	century	
and	became	a	popular	phrase	 from	the	1590s	onwards.	 In	1589	 the	ex‐Jesuit	Giovanni	Botero	
published	his	famous	work	Della	Ragion	di	Stato,	in	which	he	defined	reason	of	state	as:	‘State	is	
a	 stable	 dominion	 over	 people,	 and	 Reason	 of	 State	 is	 knowledge	 of	 the	 means	 suitable	 for	
founding,	 conserving	 and	 augmenting	 a	 dominion	 established	 in	 this	 way.	 (…)	 Although	
everything	done	with	these	ends	in	view	is	said	to	be	done	for	Reason	of	State,	nevertheless	this	
term	is	used	rather	about	 things	which	cannot	be	reduced	to	ordinary	and	usual	ragione.’27	 In	








delle	cause	della	grandezza	delle	città	(Venice,	1598)	was	 the	 first	writing	with	 the	 term	 in	 its	 title	and	established	
reason	of	state	as	a	European	topos.	 It	quickly	went	through	several	editions	and	translations	 into	German,	French,	
Spanish	 and	Latin;	 Peter	Burke,	 ‘Tacitism,	 scepticism,	 and	 reason	of	 state’,	 in	 J.	H.	Burns	 /	Mark	Goldie	 (eds.),	The	
Cambridge	History	of	Political	Thought	1450‐1700	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	 199),	 479–498,	p.	 479‐
480;	Höpfl	 points	 to	Botero’s	 explanation	of	 	 ‘ragione’	 as	 equivalent	 to	notizie,	which	his	 translators	 took	 to	mean	










(1576)	 Gentillet	 blamed	 ‘Machiavellian	 philosophy’	 for	 the	 Bartholomew’s	 Day	 Massacre	 of	
French	Protestants	in	1572,	and	explained	it	as	a	set	of	practices	equal	to	tyranny	and	above	all	
against	 three	 foundations	 of	 a	 commonwealth:	 religion,	morality	 and	 legality.	 Neither	 he	 nor	




Ribaneira,	 Possivino)	 began	 to	 theorise	 reason	 of	 state	 to	 cope	 with	 its,	 as	 they	 understood,	
Machiavellian	 and	politiques	perspectives	 of	 politics.	 Its	 canonical	 author,	 the	 ex‐Jesuit	Botero	
condemned	 its	 popular	meaning,	 i.e.	 political	 actions,	 executed	with	 a	 complete	 disregard	 for	
moral,	 legal	 and	 religious	 constraint,	 as	 Botero	 believed	 to	 be	 prescribed	 by	Machiavelli	 and	

















European	 ideas	 28	 (2002),	 163‐187	 and	 Michael	 Stolleis,	 ‘Arcana	 imperii	 und	 Ratio	 status.	 Bemerkungen	 zur	
politischen	Theorie	des	frühen	17.	Jahrhunderts’,	Veröffentlichung	der	Joachim	Jungius‐Gesellschaft	der	Wissenschaften	
Hamburg	 39	 (Göttingen:	 Vandenhoeck	 &	 Ruprecht,	 1980),	 5‐12;	 for	 the	 English	 reception	 of	 ‘reason	 of	 state’	 see	


















was	 a	 matter	 of	 evil	 advice,	 positively,	 it	 offered	 prudence,	 a	 means	 to	 practice	 politics	
intelligently	 to	 the	ruler	and	his	advisors	and	a	matter	of	wise	counsel	 taken	 from	experience	
and	history.	In	its	more	narrow	understanding,	reason	of	state	entailed	the	‘Machiavellian’	claim	




could	 no	 longer	 rely	 on	 the	 premise	 that	 the	 ruler	 could	 enhance	 the	 common	 good	 and	 the	
virtue	and	piety	of	 the	subjects	by	upholding	 the	 true	religion	without	endangering	 the	 ‘state’.	
Thus,	 authors	 could	 reason	 for	 a	 merciless	 restoration	 of	 confessional	 unity,	 but	 when	 it	
endangered	the	‘state’	religious	toleration	became	a	necessary	or	acceptable	evil.	Furthermore,	
arguments	on	the	moral	responsibility	of	the	ruler	to	execute	questioned	conduct	in	emergency	
circumstances,	 frequently	 resulted	 in	 downplaying	 of	 the	 traditional	 princely	 virtues	 	 (e.g.	
clemency	and	liberality).33		
Conal	 Condren	 argues	 that	 to	 understand	 reason	 of	 state	 properly,	 historians	 have	 to	
dissect	 this	 casuistic	 reasoning	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 stress	 on	 a	 devilish/bad	 reason	 of	 state	
distinguished	from	a	true/good	one.	The	latter	was	mostly	defined	as	serving	the	common	good	
and	virtuous	rule,	it	could	be	called	prudence	and	was	based	on	‘tenuous	and	highly	fragmented’	
evidence.	 Whereas	 authors	 usually	 paraded	 a	 bad	 reason	 of	 state	 in	 ‘detailed,	 graphic	 and	
unreliable’	terms	of	a	ruler	following	his	own	private	interests	that	led	to	the	destruction	of	the	
common	 good.	 Expressing	 a	 bad	 reason	 of	 state	 was	 ‘a	 means	 of	 mobilisation	 and	
encouragement	in	times	of	deep	division’.34	Reason	of	state	was	most	often	touched	upon	in	the	
context	 of	 accusations	 against	 certain	 factions	 or	 officeholders	 in	 terms	 of	 neglecting	 or	
subverting	the	princely	duties	towards	the	divine	and	natural	law.	However,	as	Von	Friedeburg	
stresses,	such	arguments	could	contribute	to	the	crisis	of	the	rule	of	 law.	Furthermore,	certain	
authors	 indeed	 attempted	 to	 overstretch	 the	 licit	 scope	 for	 room	 to	manoeuvre	 to	 free	 rulers	
                                                            
32Höpfl,	 ‘Orthodoxy	 and	 Reason	 of	 State’,	 216‐217;	 Harro	 Höpfl,	 ‘Reason	 of	 State’,	 in	 Henrik	 Lagerlund	 (ed.),	











from	 the	 constraints	 of	 confessional	 religion,	 law,	 and	 collaboration	 with	 elites.35	 Appeals	 to	
reason	of	state	could	both	seem	in	opposition	to	and	support	of	a	rule	of	law.	
From	 the	 late	 sixteenth	 century	 onwards,	 ‘interest	 (of	 state)’	 became	 a	 term	 that	was	







Guicciardini	 assumed	 that	 ‘particular	 interest	 is	 the	 true	 motive	 of	 men’s	 actions.’37	 The	
justifiable	 notion	 of	 profit	 or	 utility	 for	 reason	 of	 state	 became	 increasingly	 integrated	 in	 the	
term	‘interest’.	The	term	originated	in	Italy	and		moved	more	slowly	than	‘state’	or	 ‘politics’	to	
the	 northern	parts	 of	 Europe	 –in	England	 it	was	 only	 established	 in	 the	 1640s.38	 In	 1588	 the	
French	 ambassador	René	 de	 Lucinge	wrote	 that	 princes	were	driven	by	 honour	 or	 profit	 and	
because	profit	was	prevailing,	he	claimed	that:	 ‘We	shall	therefore	concern	ourselves	only	with	




therefore	he	who	treats	with	princes	should	put	no	trust	 in	 friendship,	kinship,	 treaty	nor	any	
other	tie	which	has	no	basis	in	interest’.40	In	a	slightly	more	disgruntled	manner	Boccalini	wrote:	







37	 Quoted	 from	 Viroli,	 From	 Politics	 to	 Reason	 of	 State,	 140;	 Whereas	 Guicciardini	 underlined	 the	 Aristotelian	
argument	of	 the	 legitimacy	of	 self‐interest	when	 it	 served	 the	common	good,	his	use	of	 vocabulary	of	 interest	was	
‘quite	novel’	according	to	Lionel	A.	McKenzie.	Guicciardini	borrowed	this	vocabulary	from	commercial	language,	and	













Rohan	popularised	 the	 term	 ‘interest’	 in	his	De	 l’interest	 that	became	 the	blueprint	 for	
writings	 on	 ‘the	 (true)	 interest	 of	 states	 of	 Europe’.	 Rohan’s	 famous	 interest	 analysis	
complimented	critical	analysis	of	the	moral	person	of	the	ruler	with	close	attention	to	the	nature	
of	 the	 societies	 he	 ruled	 (e.g.	 the	 present	 geographical	 position,	 political	 structures,	 religious	
make‐up,	military	 prowess	 and	 relations	with	 other	 rulers),	 so	 adding	 a	 further	 dimension	 to	
interest	 as	 reason	 of	 state.	 According	 to	Meinecke,	 these	 interest	 analyses	 resulted	 from	 ‘the	
spirit	of	modern	historical	research’	emerging	within	reason	of	state	writings.43	More	recently,	
Richard	 Devetak	 has	 similarly	 traced	 back	 the	 foundations	 of	 the	 late	 seventeenth‐century	
notion	 of	 European	 ‘states‐system’	 in	 Renaissance	 humanist	 history	 writings,	 which	 attacked	
claims	to	universal	authority	of	the	Church	or	Empire	as	well	as	legitimised	a	political	rule	and	
its	 ‘state	 interests’	 by	 historical	 analysis.	 Such	 critical	 historical	 analyses	 ‘allowed	 for	 the	
international	dimension	(…)	to	be	more	clearly	distinguished’,	and	meticulously	explained	and	
analysed.44	 Starting	 in	 the	 1630s,	 authors	 like	Rohan,	 began	 to	 consider	 the	 characteristics	 of	
various	dynastic	agglomerates,	from	which	allegedly	objective	‘true	interests	of	states’	of	Europe	
were	 derived.	 In	 doing	 so,	 they	 could	 defend	 one	 political	 faction	 as	most	 likely	 to	 pursue	 a	




see	 in	 the	 chapter	 on	 De	 la	 Court.	 Historians	 have	 underlined	 the	 fundamental	 influence	 of	





turned,	 by	 their	 nature	 or	 their	 emotions,	 to	 this	 side	 or	 that,	 according	 as	 self‐interest	 directs	 their	 minds	 and	
emotions;	 because	 in	 the	 last	 resort	 ragione	 di	 stato	 is	 little	 less	 but	 ragione	 d’interesse.’	 Quoted	 from	Meinecke,	
Machiavellism.	The	Doctrine	of	Raison	d’État,	68–69.		
43	Its	chapter	six	Meinecke	discusses	‘The	Doctrine	of	the	Best	Interest	of	the	State	in	France	at	the	time	of	Richelieu’’.	
















interest	 of	 state	 is	 hardly	 researched.46	 This	 thesis	will	 suggest	 his	 legacy	 for	 Dutch	writings	







For	 all	 the	 writers	 discussed	 in	 this	 work,	 the	 very	 real	 fears	 of	 a	 breakdown	 of	 social	 and	
political	 order,	 of	 there	 being	 no	 effective	 legal	 constraints,	 focussed	 on	 the	 threat	 of	 violent	
military	activity,	a	 fear	of	catastrophic	and	exorbitantly	expensive	warfare.	Central	 to	 this	was	
the	 fear	of	 the	predatory	monarch:	 for	Rohan	 the	Habsburg‐Spanish	ruler;	 for	De	 la	Court	 the	
internal	threat	of	the	House	of	Orange;	for	Lisola,	and	Valkenier,	Louis	XIV.	Analyses	of	interest	
of	state	enabled	authors	to	stress	the	specific	nature	of	a	polity	and	by	that	an	explicit	system	of	
government.	 In	 all	 cases	 the	 predator’s	 circumstances,	 interests	 and	 use	 of	 reason	 of	 state	
explained	 and	 heightened	 a	 sense	 of	 immediate	 danger.	 The	 specific	 characterisation	 of	 the	
demonised	enemy	varied	 from	writer	 to	writer	and	 indeed	within	each	of	 the	 texts	discussed.	
Sometimes	 the	enemy’s	 actions	were	 tyrannical	 or	despotic,	 sometimes	arbitrary;	 expressions	
such	 as	 ‘arbitrary	 rule’,	 ‘tyranny’,	 ‘war‐tyranny’,	 ‘the	 utmost	 tyranny’,	 ‘new	 monarchy’,	
‘conquest’,	 ‘Turkish	 rule’,	 and	 ‘slavery’	 are	 freely	 distributed	 throughout	 the	 texts	 and	 many	
others	 in	 their	 idiom.	 Accusations	 of	 despotic	 rule	 were	 favoured	 by	 many	 during	 the	
seventeenth	 century,	 as	 it	 was	 activity	 explicable	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 type	 of	 rule,	 the	 rule	 over	 a	
household	 of	 slaves,	 and	 also	 because	 it	 enabled	 easy	 comparison	 with	 the	 feared	 and	
unchristian	 Ottoman	 Turks.	 Sometimes	 despotism	 amounted	 to	 tyranny,	 which	 also,	 by	 its	
                                                            




Political	Maxim’,	 in:	 Journal	of	the	History	of	 Ideas	29:4	(1968),	551–564,	552.	Two	English	editions	of	De	 l’Interest	
were	published	in	London	in	1640	and	1641	and	reprinted	in	1663,	A	treatise	of	the	Interest	of	the	Princes	and	States	
of	Christendome,	translated	by	H.	Hunt.;	Alan	Houston,	‘Republicanism,	the	politics	of	necessity,	and	the	rule	of	law’,	in	




zur	Geschichte	 eines	politischen	Begriffs	 (Berlin:	 Duncker	&	Humblot,	 1975),	 497‐504;	 For	 an	 comparison	 between	
Dutch	 and	 English	 expressions	 of	 interest	 see	 Jonathan	 Scott,	 ‘Classical	 Republicanism	 in	 Seventeenth‐Century	
England	and	the	Netherlands,’	in	Martin	van	Gelderen	and	Quentin	Skinner	(eds.),	Republicanism:	A	Shared	European	
Heritage.	Volume	 I,	Republicanism	and	Constitutionalism	 in	Early	Modern	Europe	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	
Press,	2002);	Jan	Hartman	and	Weststeijn,	‘An	Empire	of	Trade:	Commercial	Reason	of	State	in	Seventeenth‐Century	


















the	 ‘predatory	 nature’	 of	 Rome,	 Spain	 and	 France.48	 To	 unmask	 such	 informing	 interests	was	
also	 to	 reveal	 a	 cohesive	 reason	 of	 state,	 negatively	 understood.	 Particularly	 in	 the	 case	 of	
Valkenier,	 the	 promotion	 of	 Louis	 XIV’s	 nefarious	 interest	 was	 facilitated	 by	 a	 barbaric	
household	rule	based	on	the	nature	of	slavish	subjects,	who	carried	the	war	burdens	willingly,	
on	power‐hunger	priests,	who	instrumentalised	religion	for	political	gain,	on	France’s	relentless	
soldiers,	who	 plundered	 and	 raped	 the	 conquered	 peoples,	 and	 on	 the	 favourites	 at	 court,	 as	
beneficiaries	of	war	profit.	 For	De	 la	Court,	 the	predatory	House	of	Orange	 required	a	 similar	
network	 of	 facilitating	 minions,	 but	 whose	 existence	 corrupted	 citizens	 rather	 than	 simply	
exploited	 the	 slaves	 of	 an	 existing	 polity	 as	 household.	 In	 short,	 regardless	 of	 specifics	 the	





47	 Jean	Marie	Constant	used	the	term	for	French	critiques	against	allegedly	 ‘despotic’	practices	of	 the	Crown	taking	
money,	property	and	privileges	to	fund	warfare.	Jean‐Marie	Constant,	‘Der	Adel	und	die	Monarchie	in	Frankreich	vom	
Tode	 Heinrichs	 IV	 bis	 zum	 Ende	 der	 Fronde	 (1610‐1653)’,	 in	 Ronald	 Asch	 (ed.),	Der	 europäische	 Adel	 im	 Ancien	
Regime.	Von	der	Krise	der	ständischen	Monarchien	bis	zur	Revolution	(1600‐1789)	(Cologne/Weimar/Vienna:	Böhlau,	





natural	 law	 as	 a	 pious	prince,	 to	 political	 delegitimations	 based	on	 analyses	 of	 a	 particular	 system	of	 government,	
which	has	been	asserted	for	critiques	of	despotism	as	examinations	of	societal	developments	depriving	people,	both	
within	 a	 country	 and	 outside,	 of	 their	 property.	 The	 argument	 by	 Pufendorf	 on	 necessary	 predatory	 behaviour	 of	
these	kingdoms	sees	Von	Friedeburg	in	 line	with	earlier	German	(chapter	6‐7)	and	French	sources	(chapter	8);	See	
also	Joan‐Pau	Rubiés,	‘Oriental	Despotism	and	European	Orientalism:	Botero	to	Montesquieu’,	Journal	of	Early	Modern	
History	 9	1/2	 (2005),	109‐180,	wherein	he	explains	despotism	 (by	examining	Montesquieu	and	earlier	 critiques	of	
despotism)	 as	 ‘a	 system	 of	 rule,	 and	 that	 it	 should	 be	 therefore	 (unlike	 tyranny)	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 structural	 feature	 of	
certain	 polities.’	 Rubies,	 ‘Oriental	 Despotism’,	 169;	 For	 the	 seventeenth‐century	 tendency	 to	 conflate	 tyranny	with	






explore	 changes	 in	 understandings	 of	 ‘interest’	 and	 ‘reason	 of	 state’	 as	 arguments	 under	
pressure	 responding	 to	 very	practical	 and	 immediate	political	problems.	Each	 chapter	 studies	
the	 function	 of	 reason	 of	 state	 in	 the	 respective	 source	 against	 the	 background	 of	 its	 specific	
context(s)	of	crisis	and	contemporary	usages	of	the	idiom	of	reason	of	state.	But	the	texts	are	not	
as	 disparate	 or	 isolated	 as	 it	 might	 seem.	 On	 one	 level,	 they	 each	 employ	 much	 the	 same	
conceptual,	 explanatory	 vocabulary	 to	 pinpoint	 the	 nature	 and	 extent	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 the	





	 In	 the	 second	 chapter,	 the	 famous	 book	 De	 l’Interest	 (1638)	 by	 Henri	 de	 Rohan	 is	
examined.	It	has	been	assessed	as	a	secular,	rational	and	objective	work.	However,	this	chapter	
reinterprets	it	as	a	work	belonging	to	the	‘genre	of	critical	current‐affairs	commentary’	emerging	
during	 the	 Thirty	 Years’	 War	 in	 which	 a	 satiric	 employment	 of	 reason	 of	 state	 (in	 terms	 of	
implicit	 criticism)	 was	 combined	 with	 reports	 on	 current	 affairs.	 It	 is	 studied	 against	 the	
backdrop	of	pressing	 factional	debates	 in	France	over	 the	pursuit	of	warfare	 intertwined	with	
debates	about	much	needed	financial	reform	and	the	issue	of	French	Protestantism,	and	Rohan’s	
dire	 need	 for	 a	 prestigious	 office	 as	 an	 exiled	 ex‐Huguenot	 leader.	 From	 this	 follows	 that	 the	
seemingly	objective	and	supra‐confessional	interest	analysis	enabled	Rohan,	firstly,	to	implicitly	
accuse	Spain	of	pursuing	unrestricted	and	universal	 tyrannical	 control,	while	 correspondingly	
sidestepping	religious	polemics;	and,	secondly,	to	envisage	a	patriotic	French	unity	in	which	the	
former	Huguenot	rebel	could	re‐claim	an	office.	
Pieter	 de	 la	 Court’s	 successful	work	 Interest	van	Holland	 (1662)	will	 be	 treated	 in	 the	
following	 chapter.	 This	 chapter	 reassess	 his	 alleged	 ‘republicanism’	 or	 ‘anti‐monarchism’	 in	
terms	of	‘war	despotism’.	To	diminish	the	threat	of	an	Orange	restoration,	De	la	Court	vigorously	
attacked	 the	 Orange	 dynasty	 by	 identifying	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 plunder	 prince,	 who	 pursued	
foreign	warfare	 to	extract	exorbitant	 taxes,	supress	 the	 fundamental	 laws	and	the	authority	of	
the	civic	assemblies,	subject	the	legal	subjects,	consequently	enslaving	them	all.	His	argument	on	
the	need	 to	 harmonise	 the	 interests	 between	 rulers	 and	 ruled	was	 at	 one	with	 contemporary	
English	arguments	on	interest	grounded	on	Rohan’s	idea	that	the	prince	may	rule	the	people,	but	
that	 interest	 ruled	 the	 prince.	 From	 this	 follows	 the	 second	 argument,	 that	 the	 Interest	 van	
Holland	 is	better	seen	as	a	distinct	variation	on	the	themes	enunciated	by	Rohan.	Although	he	




Holland	 where	 the	 privileges	 and	 properties	 of	 citizens	 were	 protected	 against	 raids	 of	 the	
plunder	prince	and	the	power‐hungry	members	of	his	household	(priests,	soldiers,	favourites)	in	
order	to	promote	effectively	the	foundation	of	the	true	interest	of	Holland:	commerce.	




notion	 of	 Europe.	 However,	 this	 chapter	 proposes	 a	 reinterpretation	 of	 Lisola’s	 argument.	 It	
argues	that	it	rested	on	a	deliberate	reversion	of	Rohan’s	interest	analysis	of	Spain	and	France.	
The	 imperial	diplomat	required	a	supraconfessional	argument	 for	persuading	 foreign	rulers	of	
various	 confessions	 to	 assist	 in	 the	 battle	 against	 Louis	 XIV.	 He	 literary	 copied	 arguments	 of	
Rohan,	 but	 turned	 these	with	 a	 great	 flair	 for	 irony	 against	 France	 as	 the	 blueprint	 for	 Louis	
XIV’s	universal	monarchy.	The	result	 is	effectively,	perhaps	self‐consciously	a	satiric	parody	of	
De	l’interest.	In	a	more	systematic	manner	he	assessed	the	French	system	of	rule,	not	only	based	
on	 the	 rule	 of	 conquest,	 but,	 echoing	 De	 la	 Court’s	 argument,	 on	 the	 slavish	 nature	 and	 its	
inherent	household	rule,	robbing	the	privileges	and	properties	of	peoples	at	home	and	abroad,	
to	 finance	 warfare	 for	 universal	 dominion.	 Against	 this,	 the	 European	 legal	 order	 should	 be	
guarded	by	a	mutual	pursuit	of	reason	of	state	and	justice.		
Petrus	Valkenier’s	 ‘t	Verwerd	Europa	(1675)	will	be	scrutinised	 in	 the	 fourth	chapter.	This	
book	 is	 a	 response	 to	 the	 ‘Year	 of	 Disaster’	 1672	 inflicted	 upon	 the	 Dutch	 Republic	 by	 the	
invasion	of	Louis	XIV	resulting	in	massive	civil	riots	and	the	restoration	of	Orange.	His	work	has	
been	 (dis)credited	 as	 a	 mere	 anti‐French	 pamphlet	 and	 his	 thought	 qualified	 as	 ‘Orange	
republicanism’,	 but	 this	 chapter	 will	 re‐evaluate	 his	 argument	 against	 the	 background	 of	 the	
perceived	crisis	of	the	rule	of	law	and	within	the	international	context	of	the	idiom	of	reason	of	
state.	He	used	 and	 transformed	 the	 arguments	 of	Rohan,	De	 la	Court	 and	Lisola.	 This	 chapter	
pinpoints	 two	 continual	 problems	 in	 Valkenier’s	 work:	 how	 to	 support	 Orange	 princely	 rule	
deeply	rooted	 in	 the	army	yet	attacking	the	belligerent	princely	 interest	of	France.	Valkenier’s	
preoccupation	 was	 with	 the	 French	 despotic	 beast.	 It	 necessitated	 the	 prince	 of	 Orange	 as	
supreme	commander,	yet	constrained	by	the	republican	constitution	and	without	interference	of	
confessional	religion.	Orange	princely	rule	could	steer	the	Republic	in	a	middle	course,	between	
anarchy	 and	 oligarchy,	 between	 libertine	 tendencies	 and	 priestcraft,	 and	 between	 plunder	
princes	 and	 power‐hungry	 regents,	 and	 effectively	 represent	 the	 Republic	 within	 the	 fierce	
dynastic	competition	of	Europe.	As	so	many	of	his	contemporaries,	he	struggled	to	restore	order.	
Finally,	the	conclusion	assesses	the	significance	of	these	interest	analyses.	The	use	and	reuse	
of	 the	 exact	method	 and	 type	 of	 argument	 for	 different,	 even	 opposing	 objectives	 shows	 the	
18	
	
highly	 polemical	 function	 of	 interest	 analysis	 and	 its	 European	 context	 rather	 than	 solely	
localised	 context.	 Furthermore	 it	 suggests	 that	 the	 modern	 constructions	 of	 absolutism	 and	
republicanism	may	distort	the	core	of	its	argument.	Above	all,	it	demonstrates	a	preoccupation	
with	 predatory	 monarchy,	 painted	 with	 Rohanesque	 maxims	 and	 concerted	 interest	 in	
dominance	 and	 destruction,	 tyranny	 and	 despotism.	 In	 this	 way	 this	 thesis	 expands	 our	


















of	state	 is	hugely	 indebted	to	the	book	De	 l’interest	des	Princes	et	 les	Etats	Chrestienté	(1638)	by	the	
Huguenot	leader	Henri	Duc	de	Rohan	(1579‐1638).49	De	l’interest	was	one	of	the	first	writings	in	which	


























are	 to	 the	 English	 edition	 translated	 by	Henry	Hunt	 and	 published	 in	 1640,	 except	when	 differences	 between	 the	
English	 and	 French	 versions	 occur;	 The	 French	 text	 reads:	 ‘Les	 princes	 commandent	 aux	 peuples	 et	 l’intérêt	






version	 by	 Christian	 Lazzeri	 of	 Henri	 de	 Rohan,	 De	 l’intérêt	 des	 princes	 et	 les	 Etats	 chrétienté	 (Paris	:	 Presses	
Universitaires	 de	 France,	 1995),	 161.	 Lazzeri	 used	 the	 edition	 of	 1646,	 published	 in	 Paris,	 and	which	 contained	 a	






name	 in	 echoing	 his	 famous	 sentences:	 ‘Of	 this	 Interest	 a	 certain	 very	 wise	 and	 experienced	
military	officer	attempted	to	say;	that	it	rules	over	the	Princes,	alike	they	over	her	Subjects	(...).’52		
As	 explained	 in	 the	 introduction,	 the	 dynastic	 rivalry	 between	 Habsburg‐Spain	 and	
Valois/Bourbon‐France	 triggered	 the	 early	 modern	 military	 competition	 between	 European	
rulers	 as	 they	were	 forced	 to	 participate	 for	 their	 survival.	 From	 this	 conflict,	 the	 Habsburg‐
Spanish	dynastic	 agglomerate	 emerged,	with	 lands	 scattered	over	Europe,	 even	over	different	
continents,	bringing	new	riches,	peoples	and	polities	under	 its	 rule.	Rohan	reflected	upon	 this	




central	 to	 understanding	 all	 counsel	 and	 policy.	 Rohan	 claimed	 that	 every	 ruler	 and	 regime,	
whether	 Catholic	 or	 Protestant,	 should	 fear	 the	 ‘secret	 design’	 or	 ‘true	 interest’	 of	 Habsburg‐
Spain	 to	 establish	 a	 ‘new	monarchy’,	 i.e.	 a	 political	 and	military	 hegemony	 in	 Europe,	 which	
could	only	be	effectively	opposed	by	the	French	monarchy	taking	up	arms.	The	‘true	interest’	of	
each	independent	European	‘state’	depended	on	a	careful	management	of	the	fragile	equilibrium	
of	 power	 between	 Habsburg‐Spain	 and	 Bourbon‐France	 or	 as	 Rohan	 wrote:	 ‘there	 be	 two	
Powers	in	Christendome,	which	are	as	the	two	Poles,	from	which	whence	descend	the	influence	of	
peace	and	warre	upon	the	other	states,	to	wit,	the	houses	of	France	and	Spain.’53		
Commentators	on	De	 l’interest	have	emphasised	 its	great	significance	 for	 the	history	of	



























Rohan’s	value	 for	 the	modern	analysis	of	 foreign	politics	 in	 terms	of	 ‘interests	of	 states’,	he	 is	
praised	for	his	allegedly	objective	and	rational	analysis	of	the	practice	of	foreign	policy,	cleansed	
from	considerations	of	morality	and	religion.	For	Meinecke	‘pure	empiricism	has	triumphed’57	in	
Rohan’s	 examination	 of	 foreign	 power	 politics.	 Albert	 Otto	 Hirschmann	 and	 Quentin	 Skinner	
credit	Rohan	to	be	the	first	author	who	opposed	passion	to	interest,	since,	according	to	Rohan,	
the	interest	is	interpreted	by	true	reason	independently	of	erratic	passions,	prejudices	and	other	
human	 defects.58	 Nannerl	 Overholser	 Keohane	 writes	 that	 for	 Rohan	 ‘interests	 of	 state	 are	
objective	 facts	 that	can	be	discerned	or	misunderstood’.59	Thuau	 follows	Meinecke	 in	claiming	
that	 De	 l’interest	 ‘vise	 à	 être	 un	 tableau	 objectif	 de	 la	 situation	 en	 Europe’,	 although	 his	
‘objectivité	a	des	limites’	because	it	is	viewed	from	a	French	perspective	and	attempted	to	justify	
direct	 warfare	 against	 Spain	 in	 the	 Thirty	 Years’	 War.60	 Church	 states	 that	 ‘Rohan’s	 book	 is	
significant,	not	for	its	positive	influence	but	for	its	frankly	secular	and	pragmatic	view	of	French	
state	interests	and	the	appropriate	means	of	implementing	them.’61	According	to	Heinz	Schilling,	
De	 l’interest	 is	 a	 token	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 state’s	 interests	 as	 ‘säkulares	 Prinzip	 und	 oberste	
Handlungsmaxime	der	Politik’,	executed	programmatically	by	Rohan.62	In	his	annotated	version	
of	De	 l’interest,	Christian	Lazzeri	addresses	a	 ‘moment	Rohan’,	echoing	Pocock’s	 ‘Machiavellian	







57	 ‘When	 one	 reads	 Rohan,	 it	 is	 as	 if	 one	 were	 stepping	 over	 from	 the	 sixteenth	 to	 the	 seventeenth	 century.	 The	
principle	of	pure	empiricism	has	triumphed,	and	there	is	a	fundamental	rejection	of	the	old	tendency	to	follow	famous	
examples	 and	 cling	 on	 to	 the	 past.	 He	 accords	 importance	 only	 to	 the	 fresh	 spring	 of	 life	 around	 him,	 constantly	
gushing	anew.’	Meinecke	compared	Rohan	with	Machiavelli,	Bodin,	Botero	and	Hugo	Grotius,	the	important	authors	






60	Thuau,	Raison	d'Etat,	313;	Meinecke,	almost	disappointedly,	had	 to	admit	 that	Rohan	was	 ‘incapable	of	complete	
objectivity’,	 since	he	analysed	 the	 interests	of	other	 rulers	 from	a	French	perspective.	Besides,	 the	underdeveloped	
stage	 of	 ‘historical	 knowledge	 at	 his	 time’	 did	 not	 benefitted	 Rohan’s	 analysis	 according	 to	 the	 German	 historian.	
Moreover,	he	directly	criticised	Rohan	‘for	the	way	in	which	these	[Rohan’s	basic	ideas	and	intentions]	are	carried	out	
and	applied	in	concrete	instances.’	Meinecke,	The	Doctrine	of	Raison	d’État,	170,	169,	170.	











emphasis	 on	 examining	 current	 political	 affairs	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 the	 interest	 of	 states	
appears	much	less	to	involve	principles	of	objectivity	or	political	autonomy	when	placed	in	the	
context	 of,	 what	 Noel	 Malcolm	 calls,	 ‘a	 genre	 of	 critical	 current‐affairs	 commentary’.65	 This	
extremely	 popular	 body	 of	 propagandistic	 literature	 evolved	 during	 the	 Thirty	 Years’	 War,	
claiming	to	publicise	the	truth,	the	secret	advice	of	princely	councils	and	to	unveil	evil	counsel,	
the	 arcana	 imperii	 of	 inter‐princely	 actions	 or	 ‘mysteries	 of	 state’,	 the	 ‘reason	 of	 state’	 or	
‘interest’	of	princes,	while	simultaneously	criticising	opponents	in	a	satiric	manner.	By	satiric	I	
am	alluding	 to	a	 conventional	 style	of	moral	 critique	 familiar	 in	 the	early	modern	world	 from	





often	 satirising	 the	 alleged	 enemy	 as	Malcolm	 shows.	 Machiavelli’s	The	 Prince	 would	 also	 be	
called	a	satire	in	this	sense	of	unmasking	of	evil,	as	Henry	Neville	in	a	prefatory	letter	(allegedly	
written	by	Machiavelli)	 to	his	 translation	of	Machiavelli’s	works	 from	1675	writes	 that	 it	was	
‘both	 a	 Satyr	 against	 them,	 [tyrants]	 and	 a	 true	 Character	 of	 them.’67	 Although	 some	




to	 implicitly	 accuse	 Spain	 of	 pursuing	 unrestricted	 and	 universal	 tyrannical	 control,	 while	
correspondingly	 sidestepping	 religious	polemics;	 and,	 secondly,	 to	 envisage	a	patriotic	French	
unity	 in	 which	 the	 former	 Huguenot	 rebel	 could	 re‐claim	 an	 office.	 This	 chapter	 aims	 at	
elucidating	this	twofold	function	of	‘reason	of	state’	terminology	in	De	l’interest.	To	begin	with,	it	
presents	a	biographical	sketch	suggesting	that	his	misfortunes	provide	a	partial	context	for	the	
writing	of	De	 l’interest.	At	 the	very	 least,	a	work	of	political	advice	 that	studiously	avoided	the	
predictable	 and	 conventional	 recourse	 to	 religious	polemic	was	 ideally	 suited	 to	Rohan’s	own	
difficult	 position	 and	 confessionally	 uncertain	 history.	 This	 section	 is	 followed	 by	 an	 short	
                                                            
65	Malcolm,	Reason	of	State,	34.	
66	 On	 the	 difficulties	 involved	 in	 defining	 satire	 read	 Conal	 Condren,	 ‘Satire	 and	 definition’,	Humor:	 International	
Journal	of	Humor	Research	25:4	(2012),	375‐399.	On	page	389	Condren	writes:	‘What	has	been	designated	satire	has	
not	always	been	intended	as	in	any	way	humorous	or	joking.	(…)	It	may	well	be	the	case	that	over	its	long	history,	the	






















anti‐Spanish	 and	 pro‐Huguenot	 policy	 while	 simultaneously	 applying	 for	 a	 position	 to	 help	
further	this	policy.	De	l’interest	was	written	on	the	eve	of	the	direct	military	intervention	of	the	
French	 monarchy	 in	 the	 Thirty	 Years’	 War	 against	 the	 Habsburgs	 dynasty	 in	 1635.69	 After	
Sweden’s	devastating	defeat	at	the	battle	of	Nördlingen	on	5	and	6	September	1634,	the	French	
pawn	on	the	chessboard	of	the	Thirty	Year’s	War	was	severely	blocked.	From	June	until	October	
of	 1634,	Rohan	 stayed	 at	 the	 royal	 court	 in	Paris,	 hoping	 to	 convince	Richelieu	 to	offer	him	 a	
military	office	 and,	perhaps	not	 coincidentally,	 incite	him	 to	undertake	a	direct	military	 stand	
against	 Spain.70	 As	 an	 eminent	 Huguenot	 military	 leader,	 Rohan	 was	 Richelieu’s	 former	
antagonist	 in	 the	 three	Huguenot	 rebellions	 (1620‐1622,	1625,	1627‐1629).	After	 the	decisive	
Huguenot	defeat	in	1629	and	Rohan’s	subsequent	exile	to	Venice,	Rohan	sought	the	patronage	of	
Richelieu	 and	 although	 receiving	 several	 military	 assignments,	 Richelieu	 had	 never	 entirely	
trusted	the	ambitious	Rohan.71	During	his	stay	at	court	Rohan	finished	his	book,	probably	added	
a	dedication	to	the	Cardinal	and	presented	it	to	Richelieu.72	In	this	dedication,	Rohan	wrote	that	
although	 Richelieu	 was	 not	 expressly	 present	 in	 the	 entire	 treatise,	 it	 would	 speak	 of	 the	
                                                            
69	Lazzeri	argues	that	the	editing	of	the	work	began	in	1630,	which	Rohan	followed	through	in	different	phases	up	till	

















Protestantism	 in	 the	 1550s	 and	 became	 a	 highly	 visible	 Protestant	 noble	 family	 after	 the	
Bartholomew’s	Day	Massacre	1572,	when	a	great	number	of	high	Protestant	nobles	converted	to	
Catholicism.	The	Rohans	had	important	connections	to	the	royal	court,	e.g.	Françoise	de	Rohan	
was	 a	 permanent	 dame	 d’honneur	 of	 Cathérine	 de	 Médicis	 in	 the	 1550s	 and	 the	 family	 was	
related,	 close	 cousins,	 to	 the	 later	 King	 Henry	 IV	 (1553‐1610)	 through	 the	 female	 line.75		
Therefore	it	is	not	so	remarkable	that	Henri	de	Rohan	dreamt	of	becoming	a	military	leader	like	
Caesar	and	an	independent	prince,	as	Jonathan	Dewald	argues.	76		
Unfortunately	 for	Rohan,	his	 life	 took	a	different	 turn.	Under	 the	Huguenot	King	Henry	
IV,	 he	 enjoyed	 royal	 patronage	 and	 favouritism,	 being	made	Duc	 de	 Rohan,	 and	was	 strongly	
supported	in	his	unsuccessful	marriage	plans	with	the	sister	of	the	Swedish	king	and	later	in	his	
marriage	to	the	daughter	of	Henry’s	principal	adviser	Maximilien	de	Béthune,	Duc	de	Sully.	After	
the	 assassination	 of	 Henry	 IV	 in	 1610,	 however,	 Rohan	 lost	 his	 high	 and	 beneficial	 position.	
Whereas	 the	 Huguenot	 nobility	 had	 profited	 from	 their	 newly	 formed	 collaboration	with	 the	
Crown	 under	 Henry	 IV,	 now	 their	 standing	 was	 severely	 diminished.	 Within	 the	 Protestant	
nobility,	 factions	 arose	 between	 those	who	wanted	 collaboration	with,	 and	 a	more	moderate	
policy	towards	the	Crown,	and	those	expressing	the	need	for	a	more	radical	and	offensive	policy	
as	 Rohan	 supported.	 	 Simultaneously,	 the	 regency	 of	 Maria	 Medici	 brought	 forth	 several	
aristocratic	 factions	 in	which	Rohan	was	variously	 involved.	He	first	 fought	against	 the	regent,	
but	 with	 her	 after	 her	 exclusion	 and	 imprisonment	 by	 her	 son	 King	 Louis	 III	 in	 1617.	 One	
consequence	 of	 these	 shifts	 in	 allegiance	 was	 the	 nickname	 ‘Catiline’	 for	 his	 intrigues	 and	
ruthless	 ambition.	 77	 	 After	 1610,	 the	 Huguenot’s	 religious	 freedom	 and	 property	 rights	were	
severely	 reduced	by	 the	 French	Crown.	Over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 1620s	 civil	wars	 broke	 out,	 in	
which	 Rohan	 switched	 sides	 between	 the	 divided	 Huguenot	 power	 groups	 on	 a	 number	 of	
occasions.	 Within	 the	 Huguenot	 camp	 Rohan	 was	 mistrusted	 and	 accused	 of	 treachery	 for	
                                                            
73	The	closing	sentences	were	as	following:	‘Vous	vous	verrez	donc	dans	peu	de	lignes	représenté	tout	entier:	en	tout	













losses	 and	 for	 his	 exile	 to	 Venice.	 Here	 he	 started	 writing	 the	 De	 l’interest	 amongst	 other	
treatises.		
Perhaps	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 Richelieu	 mistrusted	 Rohan	 when	 he	 sought	 a	
prestigious	office	after	1629.	Nevertheless,	at	 the	end	of	1631,	he	was	sent	as	a	French	envoy	
and	 lieutenant	general	 to	assist	 the	canton	of	Grisons	 in	expelling	 the	Spanish	 forces	 from	the	
Valtelline	passes.	These	passes	formed	not	only	the	stage	of	several	brutal	confessional	conflicts	
between	 the	 Catholic	 inhabitants	 and	 their	 Protestant	 rulers,	 but	 also	 a	 strategic	 passage	
between	 the	Habsburgs’	 Austrian	 and	 Spanish	 territories,	 important	 to	 the	 competing	 parties	
within	 the	Thirty	Year’s	War	and	 accordingly	much	 fought	over.78	There,	he	was	 suspected	of	
being	 a	 spy	 by	 another	 French	 envoy	 and	 subsequently	 lost	 his	 post	 in	 1632.	 A	 year	 later	 he	
resumed	his	post,	but	lost	his	ambassadorial	status.	In	the	summer	of	1634	he	stayed	at	the	royal	







famous	 treatises:	 De	 l’interest,	 Le	 parfait	 capitaine	 (1638)	 that	 embodied	 admiring	
commentaries	on	Julius	Caesar	and	reflections	on	military	practice,	dedicated	to	the	French	king,	
and	his	Mémoirs	 (first	 three	books	printed	 in	1644)	of	 the	Huguenot	rebellions	of	 the	1620s.80	
The	 first	 publication	 stream	 of	De	 l’Interest	 occurred	 from	 1637	 to	 1639,	when	 after	 Rohan’s	
defeat,	 the	 issue	 of	 control	 over	 the	 Valtelline	 passes	 rose	 again	 in	 France.81	 In	 1637,	 it	 was	










79David	 Parrott,	 Richelieu’s	 Army:	 War,	 Government	 and	 Society	 in	 France,	 1624‐1642	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	
University	Press,	2001),	489‐490.	
80	Dewald,	Status,	power,	and	identity	in	early	modern	France,	70.	






the	 Parfait	 capitaine.	 Dewald	 and	 Meinecke	 both	 argue	 that	 Rohan	 intended	 to	 publish	 De	









regard	 to	 its	 social	 contours.’85	 	 It	 is	 also	worth	noting,	however,	 that	 the	 fiction	of	 accidental	











Rohan’s	 interest	 analysis	 on	 a	 European	 scale	 enabled	 him	 to	 criticise	 implicitly	 Habsburgs‐
Spain	and	to	forge	a	patriotic	unity	for	France	by	sidestepping	the	divisiveness	that	accompanied	























of	 state	 became	 integrated	 from	 the	 late	 sixteenth	 century	 onwards	 in	 this	 broad	 vocabulary	
resulting	 in	 several	 synonyms	 for	 ‘reason	 of	 state’	 such	 as	 ‘interest	 of	 state’,	 the	 Tacitist	
expression	 arcana	 imperii,	 ‘secrets’	 and	 ‘mysteries’.89	 Before	 the	 reception	 of	 reason	 of	 state	
vocabulary	in	France	in	the	late	sixteenth	century,	the	terms	‘Machiavellism’	and	‘Machiavellist’	
were	already	established	and	in	popular	use.90	During	the	religious	wars	in	France	(1562‐1598),	
accusations	of	 ‘Machiavellism’	 thrived	amongst	all	 factions	 involved.91	 In	 the	1570s,	 Italians	at	
the	 Parisian	 court	 defended	 the	monstrosities	 of	 the	 religious	wars	with	 a	 cynical	 outlook	 on	
politics,	 using	 Machiavelli,	 Guicciardini,	 and	 Tactius	 or	 Tacitean	 language.92	 The	 reading	 of	
Tacitus’	accounts	of	the	misdemeanours	of	Roman	emperors	became	extremely	popular	amidst	
the	noble	factions	and	courtly	politics	of	the	wars.	The	ancient	historian	was	usually	used	as	a	
supplementary	 or	 even	 alternative	 authority	 to	 the	 extremely	 controversial	 Machiavelli.93	
According	 to	 Jacob	 Soll,	 Justus	 Lipsius	 created	 an	 ‘accessible	 version	 of	 political	 prudence	 for	





90	 Jan	Wazink,	 ‘Introduction’	 to	Politica:	Six	Books	of	Politics	Or	Political	 Instruction,	by	 Justus	Lipsius	(Assen:	Royal	
Van	Gorchum,	2004),	45.	
91	The	preacher	Boucher	claimed	that	Henry	III	carried	a	copy	of	The	Prince	in	his	pocket	and	attempted	to	introduce	
Machiavelli’s	 policies	 in	 France.	 The	 Catholic	 League	 accused	 the	 politiques	 of	 Machiavellism	 by	 allegedly	
subordinating	 the	Catholic	cause	 to	political	considerations.	 In	 turn,	 the	politiques	accused	 the	League	of	conveying	
their	personal	interests,	driven	by	power	politics,	under	the	cloak	of	appealing	to	the	‘bien	public’.	In	his	famous	Anti‐











Machiavellinism	and	reason	of	 state	 in	France,	Marcel	Gauchet,	 ‘L’Etat	au	miroir	de	 la	 raison	d’Etat:	 la	France	et	 la	
chrétienté’,	in	Yves	Charles	Zarka	(ed.),	Raison	et	déraison	d’Etat.	Théoriciens	et	théories	de	la	raison	d’Etat	aux	XIVe	et	
XVIIe	siècles	(Paris:	Presses	Universitaires	de	France,	1994),	193‐244.	
94	 Pierre	 Charron	 outlined	 prudence	 as	 the	 legitimate	 scope	 for	 rulers	 to	 act	 freely	 from	 legal	 and/or	 religious	
constraints	 for	 the	 common	 good,	 which	 in	 his	 opinion	 ought	 to	 be	 analysed	 by	 reading	 Lipsius.	 Soll,	 ‘A	 Lipsian	
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writings	 often	 were	 (dis‐)qualified	 as	 reason	 of	 state,	 and	 associated	 with	 Machiavellism	 for	
recommending	 the	 use	 of	 religion	 for	political	 gain.95	Most	 readers	 on	 ‘reason	of	 state’	would	
have	 been	 appalled	 by	 such	 recommendations,96	 which	 we	 ought	 to	 keep	 in	 mind	 when	
discussing	Rohan’s	 counsel	of	 religious	dissimulation	 for	Spain.	Tacitism	(and	 reason	of	 state)	
offered	contemporaries	the	 ‘true’	causes	and	self‐interested	motives	of	famous	political	figures	
in	history	and	the	historical	workings	of	power	politics.	Such	critical	political	history	became	a	




Another	 important	 aspect	 of	 French	 reason	 of	 state	 is	 the	 transition	 in	 French	 official	
political	vocabulary	from	the	1560s	onwards	and	completed	under	King	Henry	IV’s,	which	James	
Collins	 has	 described	 as	 a	 linguistic	 shift	 from	 the	 ‘monarchical	 commonwealth’	 to	 the	
‘monarchical	state’.	In	the	context	of	the	disastrous	and	traumatic	religious	wars,	royal	officials	
searched	for	alternatives	to	the	traditional	vocabulary	of	the	‘respublique	françoyse’	in	terms	of	
appealing	 to	 the	 ‘bien	public’,	 adhering	 the	 ‘true	 religion’	 and	 following	 the	precepts	of	 ‘piety’	
and	 ‘justice’.	The	notion	of	a	French	respublica	as	one	political	community	of	citizens,	ruled	by	
law	and	consent,	striving	to	obtain	the	‘bien	public’,	had	become	severely	discredited,	not	least	
due	 to	 the	 extensive	 use	 of	 appeals	 to	 the	 ‘bien	 public’	 by	 the	 Catholic	 League.98	 First	 the	





‘discourse	 confusion’	 in	many	French	documents	 in	 the	 first	 third	of	 the	 seventeenth	 century,	
since	‘state’	most	often	meant	the	government	or	the	king’s	administration,	besides	addressing	
order,	 disposition	 or	 policies.99	 The	 ‘commonwealth’	 gradually	 became	 the	 ‘state’	 and	 rulers	
could	 henceforth	 claim	 to	 act	as,	 rather	 than	 for	 the	 commonwealth.	 Appeals	 to	 the	 common	
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Legacy?’,	309‐311	and	citation	 from	310;	 Jan	Waszink,	 ‘Lipsius	and	Grotius:	Tacitism’,	History	of	 Ideas	39:2	(2013),	
151‐168,	158;	Particularly	in	France,	‘Lipsian	Tacitism’	flourished,	for	examples	see	Jacob	Soll,	Publishing	The	Prince.	
History,	Reading,	&	the	Birth	of	Political	Criticism	(Ann	Arbor:	The	University	of	Michigan	Press,	2005),	36‐37.		




98	 This	 definition	 of	 political	 order	 developed	 from	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 fourteenth	 century	 until	 the	 late	 sixteenth	
century,	 influenced	by	Aristotle,	Polybius	and	Cicero.	Collins,	The	State	 in	Early	Modern	France	 2nd	 ed.	 (Cambridge:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	2009),	3‐4.		
99	The	vocabulary	of	the	‘respublique	françoyse’	continued	to	be	used	especially	for	towns	in	economic	matters	such	
as	corporations	as	guilds	 in	charters.	Collins,	Republicanism	and	 the	State	 in	 late	medieval	and	early	modern	France	







later	 Antoine	 de	 Lavall	 exclaimed	 that	 reason	 of	 state,	 this	 novel	 language	 from	 Rome	 and	
Venice,	 had	 become	 so	 popular	 that	 everyone,	 great	 as	 well	 as	 small	 men,	 discussed	 it	
everywhere.	 Even	 newspapers	 could	 speak	 of	 nothing	 else,	 according	 to	 Lavall.101	 The	 French	
term	 ‘raison	d’état’	was	a	 translation	of	 the	 Italian	 ‘ragion	di	stato’	and	the	Latin	 ‘ratio	status’,	
both	sixteenth‐century	neologisms.102	At	 the	close	of	 the	sixteenth	century,	Botero’s	and	many	
other	 Italian	 writings	 discussing	 reason	 of	 state	 became	 popular	 in	 France.103	 Similar	 to	
religiously	orthodox	writers	such	as	Botero,	Lavall	and	many	other	French	authors	condemned	
reason	 of	 state	 as	 Machiavellian	 immorality	 and	 indifference	 to	 law,	 while	 simultaneously	
elucidated	and	justified	reason	of	state	under	the	auspices	of	prudence	and	necessity.104		
Rohan’s	usage	of	the	phrase	‘the	(true)	interest	of	state’	was	built	upon	existing	ideas	of	
interest.	As	 clarified	 in	 the	 introduction,	 the	 justifiable	notion	of	profit	 or	utility	 for	 reason	of	
state	became	increasingly	integrated	in	the	term	‘interest’,	manifested	in	arguments	of	 interest	
as	the	driving	force	behind	princely	politics	and	an	increasing	usage	of	‘interest	of	state’	as	more	
or	 less	 synonymous	 with	 ‘reason	 of	 state’.	 The	 closely	 related,	 even	 sometimes	 synonymous	
expressions	of	interest	and	raison	d’estat	provided	a	well	established	currency	of	debate	by	the	
time	Rohan	wrote.	In	1588,	René	de	Lucinge	(a	friend	of	Botero)	wrote	that	princes	were	driven	
by	 honour	 or	 profit	 and	 because	 profit	 was	 prevailing,	 he	 claimed	 that:	 ‘We	 shall	 therefore	
                                                            
100	 Collins,	The	State	 in	Early	Modern	France,	 xxiii;	Malcolm,	Reason	of	State,	 94.	 This	 transition	 in	 French	political	
vocabulary	overlaps	the	late‐sixteenth	century	shift,	argued	by	Maurizio	Viroli	and	described	in	the	introduction,	from	
a	language	of	understanding	politics	as	preserving	the	respublica	(a	community	of	citizens	ruled	by	law	and	consent)	





the	 thirteenth	century	descriptions	of	 ‘state’	as	 the	society	of	orders	 (social	and	 legal	 condition	of	 certain	group	as	
corporation)	 and	 the	 state	 of	 the	 prince	 as	 the	 condition	 by	 which	 he	 exercised	 his	 royal	 power	 via	 certain	
corporations,	to	the	substitution	of	respublica	by	‘state’	in	the	second	half	of	the	sixteenth	century	by	‘constitionalist’	
writers	as	Claude	de	Seyssel,	Theorore	de	Bèze	and	François	Hotman.	These	authors,	 though	somewhat	differently,	

















of	 the	regency	of	Maria	de	Medici	 from	1610	to	1617,	 the	 term	 ‘interest’	was	more	commonly	
used	than	‘raison	d’estat’.	Huguenot	writings	from	Coligny	in	1572	similarly	argued	in	terms	of	
interest	 and	 reason	 of	 state,	 with	 perhaps	 increasingly,	 interest	 being	 the	 notion	 to	 which	
greater	 attention	was	given.106	Richelieu’s	publicists	made	 intensive	use	of	 the	 terminology	of	
‘interest’	and	by	the	time	De	l’interest	was	published	(1638)	it	was	well	established.107	
To	state	that	Rohan’s	interest	analysis	should	be	seen	in	light	of	hyperbolic	exaggeration	





rule	 vis‐à‐vis	 his	 subjects	 and	 relations	 with	 other	 regimes.	 These	 interest	 analyses	 resulted	
from	 the	 increasing	 employment	 of	 historical	 analysis,	 which	 enabled	 authors	 to	 indicate	 the	
circumstances	 and	 characteristics	 of	 the	 societies	 of	 the	 rulers	 and	 to	 distinguish	 these	 from	
‘foreign’	polities.108	
Moreover,	 in	 claiming	 that	 interest	 ruled	 rulers,	 he	 indeed	 diminished	 the	 guiding	
importance	 of	 the	 ethics	 of	 office.	 Conal	 Condren	 and	 Ryan	 Walter	 have	 pointed	 to	 Rohan’s	
contribution	 to	 a	 gradual	 dissociation	 of	 ‘interest’	 from	 ‘notions	 of	 office’.109	 By	 primarily	
                                                            
105	Quoted	form	Malcolm,	‘“Reason	of	State”	and	Hobbes’,	94	
106	 Salmon,	 ‘Rohan	 and	 the	 interest	 of	 state’,	 102‐103,	 108,	 126‐127,	 footnotes	 44	 and	 45;	 Maria’s	 regency	 was	
pestered	by	rebellions	of	major	nobles	and	ended	with	the	murder	of	Maria’s	favourite	Concino	Concini,	executed	by	
Louis	XII	and	his	men.	Collins,	The	State	in	Early	Modern	France,	xxix;	In	several	writings	of	the	1610s,	Rohan	likewise	
argued	 for	 a	 pro‐protestant	 foreign	 policy	 against	 France’s	 belligerent	 Spanish	 neighbour.	 The	 Huguenot	 leader	
similarly	pointed	to	the	(mis‐)use	of	religion	as	political	pretext	as	it,	according	to	him,	had	been	uttered	in	the	French	
Wars	 of	 Religion	 and	 by	Habsburgs‐Spain	 in	 its	wars	 against	 foreign	 princes	 and	 peoples.	 See	 Salmon,	 for	 a	 short	
summary	for	each	specific	writing.	Salmon,	‘Rohan	and	the	interest	of	state’,	100‐103.	For	a	total	overview	of	Rohan’s	
writings	 and	 editions	 of	 De	 l’interest	 read	 Lazzeri,	 ‘Introduction’,	 153‐156;	 Étienne	 Thuau	 points	 to	 a	 particular	
collection	of	 anonymous	pamphlets	 from	 the	1610s	 and	1620s	wherein	 the	 advancement	of	 the	Habsburg‐Spanish	
monarchy	was	perceived	as	a	grave	threat	to	the	existence	of	France	and	the	rest	of	Europe,	and	that,	consequently,	





motives	 of	 its	 rivals’	 by	 looking	 into	 ‘the	 particular	 situation	 of	 a	 particular	 individual	 country’,	 but	 gained	 its	 full	
potential	 under	 Richelieu’s	 government,	when	 France	 re‐entered	 the	 European	war	 competition.	Meinecke	 argued	
that	the	Wars	of	Religion	fostered	the	‘recognition	of	the	true	collective	interest	of	the	whole	of	France’:	anti‐Spanish	
and	religious	toleration.	These	ideas	were	put	into	practice	under	the	rule	Henry	IV,	but	during	the	regency	of	Maria	
de	Medici,	 France	neglected	 this	 interest	until	 the	growth	of	Habsburg‐Spanish	power,	 the	Habsburgs	geographical	
enclosure	of	the	French	monarchy	and	the	marriage	negotiations	between	the	Spanish	infant	and	the	young	Charles	
produced	substantial	fear	amongst	French	politicians.	Meinecke,	The	Doctrine	of	Raison	d’État,	146,	147,	151;	Lazzeri	
‘Introduction’,	 87	 for	 origins	 of	 interest	 analyses	 in	 Ventian	 relatione	 reports;	 Richard	 Devetak,	 ‘Historiographical	





almost	 in	 as	 complementary	 a	 fashion	 as	 honestas	 and	 utilitas.	 But	 it	 also	 allowed	 for	 forms	 of	 explanation	
31	
	
focusing	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 societies	 of	 rulers,	 e.g.	 the	 present	 geographical	 position,	 political	
structures,	religious	make‐up,	military	prowess	and	relations	with	other	rulers,	he	was	able	to	
marginalise	 well‐established	 questions	 concerning	 princely	 virtue,	 piety	 and	 confessional	











his	 advisers	 and	 ‘unveil’	 their	 secretive	 political	 schemes.	 Richelieu	 turned	 this	 dangerous	
criticism	into	rather	successful	propaganda	for	the	Crown	by	publication	strategies	and	a	system	
of	 censorship,	 reaching	 a	 relatively	 large	 readership.111	 Laurie	 Catteeuw	 argues	 that	 these	
outbursts	on	reason	of	state	subsequently	 transformed	the	associated	notion	of	necessitas:	 the	
extraordinary	 became	 ordinary.	 Under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 terminology	 of	 reason	 of	 state,	 the	
ancient	 maxim	 of	 ‘necessity	 knows	 no	 law’	 gradually	 transformed	 into	 an	 argument	 that	
‘necessity	 makes	 law’.112	 Nonetheless,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 crisis,	 reason	 of	 state	 became	 quite	







of	History	of	 Ideas	64:2	(2003),	297‐316,	 in	particular	306,	309;	Laurie	Catteuw,	 ‘L’inacceptable	 face	aux	nécessités	
politiques	 :	 les	 relations	 entre	 censures	 et	 raisons	d’état	 à	 l’époque	moderne’	 in	Les	Dossiers	du	Grihl	 [online],	 Les	





323‐342,	 p.	 333;	 The	 most	 famous	 or	 notorious	 example	 of	 Richelieu’s	 promotion	 of	 reason	 of	 state	 is	 probably	
Considérations	 politiques	 sur	 les	 coups‐d'état	 (1639)	 by	 the	 Cardinal’s	 librarian,	 Gabriel	 Naudé,	 who,	 inspired	 by	
Charron	and	Lipsius,	 extended	 the	 legitimate	scope	of	prudence	or	political	 fraud	 to	every	member	of	 government	
instead	of	solely	to	the	prince,	and	distinguished	between	an	‘ordinary’	and	moral	prudence	and	‘extraordinary’	and	
openly	 immoral	prudence.	The	 latter	political	 fraud	was	not	merely	personal	dissimulation	of	 the	prince	but	 could	
involve	bold	and	intervenient	action,	overstretching	ordinary	moral	and	legal	boundaries,	justified	for	the	sake	of	the	
common	good.	It	was	however	imperative	for	its	success	that	such	action	was	executed	in	the	utmost	secrecy,	as	he	
assessed	 the	 Bartholomew’s	 Massacre	 as	 ‘very	 just’	 but	 unfortunately	 ‘done	 by	 halves’.	 Peter	 Burke,	 ‘Tacitism,	





Instead	 of	 mirroring	 policies	 of	 ‘statebuilding’	 or	 ‘absolutism’	 of	 the	 Bourbon	
monarchy,114	 French	 use	 of	 reason	 of	 state	 vocabulary	 largely	 reflected	 pressing	 political	
problems,	brought	forth	by	warfare	and	its	financial	consequences.	In	the	late	1620s,	concerns	
about	the	rise	 in	power	of	Habsburg‐Spain,	coincided	with	domestic	political	debates,	wherein	
two	 ill‐defined	 factions	 could	 be	distinguished.	 The	dévots,	 led	 by	 the	Queen	Regent	Marie	 de	
Médicis	and	the	keeper	of	the	seals	Michel	de	Marillac,	favoured	the	superiority	of	the	Vatican	in	
domestic	ecclesiastical	matters	and	a	pro‐Habsburg,	non‐belligerent	foreign	policy	that	ensured	
time	and	money	 to	 initiate	much	needed	 internal	 reforms	and	 to	annihilate	 the	Protestants	at	
home.	On	the	other	side	stood	the	bons	Français,	headed	by	Cardinal	Richelieu,	who	argued	for	
the	relative	autonomy	of	the	French	Church	and,	above	all,	 the	dire	need	for	an	offensive	anti‐
Habsburg	 war	 and,	 therefore,	 a	 postponement	 of	 domestic	 reforms.	 This	 debate	 dominated	
French	politics	until	the	peace	of	the	Pyrenees	between	Spain	and	France	in	1659.	According	to	
Collins,	the	dévots	reflected	a	renewed	stress	on	personal	piety	and	a	more	rigorous	religion	in	
France.	William	Church	even	 claims	 that	under	his	ministry,	Richelieu	dealt	with	a	 revitalised	
Catholicism	 ‘which	 was	 stronger	 than	 any	 similar	 religious	 movement	 in	 the	 three	 earlier	
reigns.’115		
Other	 crucial	 issues	 that	 pressured	 the	 Crown	 were	 dynastic	 fragility	 (the	 later	 King	
Louis	XIV	was	born	not	until	 1638),	 the	powerful	grandees,	 as	well	 as	 the	growing	gap	 in	 the	
government’s	budget,	illustrated	by	the	partial	bankruptcy	of	1634.	By	the	time	De	l’interest	was	







rulers	 and	 their	 advisors,	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 openly	 debating	 reason	 of	 state,	 analysed	 by	 rulers	 and	 ruled,	 and	
consequently	 reason	 of	 state	 developed	 into	 a	 weapon	 against	 the	 Crown.	 Gauchet,	 ‘L’Etat	 au	miroir	 de	 la	 raison	
d’Etat’;	Jacob	Soll	demonstrates	the	Crown’s	rejection	of	the	idiom	of	reason	of	state	from	the	1660s	onwards,	largely	
set	up	by	financial	minster,	Jean	Baptiste	de	Colbert,	who	exclaimed	the	ineffectiveness	and	danger	of	Naudé’s	political	
views,	 and	 promoted	 a	 panegyric,	 more	 eloquently	 Ciceronian	 history‐writing	 instead	 of	 a	 critically	 political	 and	
Tacitist	one.	Soll,	‘A	lipsian	legacy?’.		










1653.	 Collins	 even	 speaks	 of	 ‘the	 twenty	 years	 crisis	 1635‐1654’.116	 These	 crisis	 years	 fuelled	
debates	 on	 reason	 of	 state,	 discussing	 and	 stretching	 the	 legitimate	 scope	 for	 the	 regime	 to	
execute	 extraordinary	 measures	 against	 domestic	 political	 agitators	 and	 competitors,	 and	
against	foreign	regimes	generally.117		
Church	 states	 that	 under	 Richelieu	 foreign	 affairs	 were	 more	 frequently	 discussed	 in	
French	reason	of	state	writings	than	domestic	ones,	however,	such	matters	were	most	often	than	
not	 intertwined	as	witnessed	 in	debates	between	 the	dévots	and	bons	Français.118	The	market	
was	 flooded	with	publications	defending	 anti‐Habsburg	policies	 in	 the	 ‘interest’	 of	 the	French	
‘state’	 and,	 often	 added,	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 Catholicism.119	 The	 French	Crown’s	 return	 to	 costly	
anti‐Habsburg	 foreign	 policy	 received	 massive	 criticism,	 but	 because	 the	 growing	 financial	




















writings	 triggered	 by	 the	 power	 struggle	 between	 Richelieu,	 and	 Maria	 de	 Medici	 and	 her	 third	 son	 and	 heir‐
presumptive	Gaston	d’Orléans,	escalating	 in	 the	Day	of	 the	Dupes	(±10	November	1630)	and	Louis	XIII	subsequent	
decision	 in	 favour	of	Richelieu	and	against	Gaston	and	his	 followers,	declaring	them	guilty	of	 lèse‐majesté,	of	which	
several	high	nobles	were	trialled	and	executed.			
119	Read	for	various	examples	such	as	Richelieu’s	own	writings	Thuau,	Raison	d'Etat,	308;	Earliest	examples	from		the	
Valtelline	 episode	 of	 1624‐1626.	 For	 pamphlets	 defending	 Richelieu’s	 anti‐Habsburgs	 policy	 in	 terms	 of	 reason	 of	
state	vocabulary	during	this	episode	see	Church	chapter	on	‘the	Valtelline	episode’,	Richelieu	and	Reason	of	State,	103‐
172,	especially	paged	126‐173.	Notably,	these	defences	were	rather	for	a	foreign	readership	than	a	domestic	one	since	
the	dévots	 initially	supported	French	intervention	 in	 the	 Italian	valley.	A	 famous	example	of	a	 treatise	defending	an	









of	 the	 many	 involved	 parties,	 interdependent	 conflicts	 and	 ever‐changing	 alliances.	 Malcolm	
distinguished	 three	groups	of	 readers:	 the	 largest	part	may	have	 read	popular	 satire	 for	 their	
amusement,	the	elite	may	have	rather	read	official	declarations	of	both	sides	in	order	to	validate	
the	 legality	of	 the	demands,	and	the	major	part	of	 the	educated	reading	public	may	have	been	
fascinated,	 even	exhilarated	by	 reason	of	 state.	This	 latter	group	was	already	acquainted	with	
many	 writings	 on	 the	 subject	 and	 could	 now,	 as	 the	 war	 evolved,	 delve	 deeper	 into	 the	
seemingly	 secretive	 princely	 politics	 of	 reason	 of	 state,	 which	 appeared	 to	 be	 tested	 and	





and	 damaging	 to	 Catholicism,	 while	 displaying	 Spain	 as	 defenders	 of	 the	 religion.	 Counter‐
pamphlets	 were	 published	 in	 the	 Mercure	 français,	 suggesting	 the	 Crown’s	 approval,	 and	




political	 affairs	 is	 false.	 Malcolm	 claims	 that	 this	 genre	 ‘hovered	 somewhere	 between	 the	
publications	of	genuine	documents	on	the	one	hand,	and,	on	the	other,	the	fanciful	(and	in	this	




opponent’s	 dissimulations	 and	 simulations	was	 even	more	 effective	when	 it	 told	 the	 truth,	 as	
Malcolm	points	to	Rohan’s	advice	that	the	French	monarchy	ought	to	expose	Spanish	and	Papal	
misuses	of	the	Catholic	religion	‘to	make	the	Catholickes	perceiue	the	venome	hidden	vndes	(sic.)	
the	 same’.124	 Reason	 of	 state	 could	 be	 used	 ‘to	 build	 on	 its	 credibility	 and	 exploit	 its	
disreputability’.125	 In	some	extreme	cases	a	purely	parodic	version	of	 reason	of	 state	could	be	
presented,	 but	 one	 should	 be	 aware	 that	 contemporary	 readers	 familiar	with	 reason	 of	 state	












implications	 and	 extremes	 to	 which	 policy	 might	 lead,	 often	 attacked	 through	 urgent	
exaggeration	 as	 if	 they	were	 already	practiced.	Thus,	writings	within	 this	 genre	 could	 involve	
satiric	elements	while	simultaneously	they	were	‘meant	to	be	taken	seriously’.126	The	integration	




recognition	 of	 modern	 state	 building	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 an	 institutionalised	 fiscal‐military	 state.	
Rohan’s	hostile	image	of	Spain	as	the	aspiring	‘new	monarchy’	rested	upon	a	longer	tradition	of	
propaganda	 on	 ‘universal	 monarchy’,	 which	 in	 early	 modern	 Europe	 was	 shaped	 by	 the	
intensification	of	warfare	from	which	powerful	dynastic	agglomerates	emerged.	By	the	time	of	
Charles	 V	 the	 notion	 of	 universal	 monarchy	 has	 lost	 its	 predominant	 theoretical	 nature	 in	
conflicts	 between	 the	 pope	 and	 the	 emperor	 and	 had	 been	 transformed	 into	 a	 subject	 for	
political	debate	regarding	the	organisation	of	European	politics.	Moreover,	the	notion	was	used	
prejudicially,	 suggesting	 that	 one	 power	 within	 Europe	 acted	 by	 ‘illegal	 power	 politics’,	 and	
occurred	more	often	 than	not	 in	debates	 about	 the	French‐Spanish	 rivalry.	The	 association	of	
universal	monarchy	with	the	imperial	dignity	of	the	Holy	Roman	Empire	vanished,	because	the	
Spanish	 kings	 had	 taken	 over	 the	 original	 imperial	 duty	 to	 protect	 the	 Catholic	 Church	 and,	
subsequently,	a	similar	claim	over	the	other	European	rulers.	In	the	context	of	the	Thirty	Years’	
War,	 the	 use	 of	 the	 universal	 monarchy	 argument	 exploded	 in	 pamphlets	 against	 Habsburg‐
Spain;	 its	 aspiration	 for	 universal	 monarchy	 seen	 as	 the	 prime	 cause	 of	 the	 war.	 Universal	
increasingly	referred	to	a	feared	military	hegemony.128	
Rohan’s	 hyperbolic	 portrayal	 of	 the	 Spanish	 interest,	 i.e.	 seeking	 ‘new	 monarchy’	 by	
dissimilating	piety	and	political	and	military	oppression,	illustrates	this	negative	connotation	of	
‘universal	 monarchy’.	 Since	 propaganda	 against	 Charles	 V,	 universal	 monarchy	 was	 often	
delegitimised	as	an	unjust	rule,	motivated	solely	by	the	ruler’s	personal	desire	for	glory	and	gain.	
This	was	considered	to	be,	in	the	words	of	the	historian	Franz	Bosbach,	‘a	mere	tyranny,	because	





128	Bosbach,	 ‘The	European	Debate	on	Universal	Monarchy’,	 in	David	Armitage	(ed.),	Theories	 in	Empire,	1450‐1850	
(Aldershot:	 Ashgate,	 1998),	 81‐98,	 p.	 84‐92;	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 Philip	 II	 likewise	 endorsed	 propaganda	






universal	 ruler.’129	 English	 literature	 on	 tyranny	 followed	 a	 similar	 pattern.	 A	 subordinate	
allegation	 to	 such	 charges	 of	 tyranny	 was	 rapacity	 creating	 slavery,	 a	 rule	 by	 accumulative	
conquest	 of	 each	 European	 polity.130	 Recent	 historical	 research	 has	 even	 qualified	 Habsburg‐
Spain	as	a	monarchy	based	on	violent	conquest.131	Famous	examples	are	to	be	found	in	the	so‐
called	 ‘Black	 Legend’	 pamphlets,	 which	 usually	 conveyed	 accusations	 of	 Spanish	 universal	
monarchy	 through	 religious‐apocalyptic	 imagery	 demonizing	 the	 Habsburgs	 rulers	 and	 the	
Spanish	soldiers.132	Furthermore,	the	accusation	of	Spain’s	(and	later	France’s)	usage	of	religion,	
a	 zeal	 for	 Catholicism	 to	 cover	 their	 desire	 for	 universal	 dominion	 instead	 of	 defending	 the	
societas	christiana,	was	a	recurrent	argument	in	such	propaganda.133	 	Charges	of	tyranny	were	
central	 to	religious	polemics,	which	can	explain	why	Rohan,	not	wishing	to	excite	confessional	
differences	 within	 France,	 refrained	 from	 overtly	 using	 this	 language.	 However,	 since	 the	
legitimating	 language	 of	 tyranny	was	 extremely	 slippery,	 relating	 to	 a	 vast	 number	 of	 terms,	
there	was	no	need	to	be	explicit.134			
	 Overall,	 I	have	 suggested	an	 inter‐related	 set	of	 contexts	directly	 relevant	 to	L’interest.	
Rohan	 grew	 up	 during	 the	 tumultuous	 period	 of	 civil	 wars,	 confessional	 strife,	 rebellious	
princely	 factions,	 and	 dynastic	 crisis.	 This	 fuelled	 the	 popularity	 of	 ideas	 on	 the	 utility	 and	
necessity	of	(princely)	practical	prudence,	on	dissimulation	and	simulation,	on	reading	history	to	




Bosbach,	 ‘The	European	debate	on	universal	monarch’,	89,	95‐96;	Lazzeri,	168	 footnote	1	examples	of	defences	 for	
French	 anti‐Habsburgs	policy	 in	French	publications	 from	 the	1620s,	 but	 also	 the	French	 translation	of	Boccalini’s	
famous	work,	La	pierre	de	touche	politique	of	1626	and	Gabriel	Naudé’s	considerations.	
130	 Conal	 Condren	 has	 reported	 the	 wide	 range	 of	 accusations	 of	 ‘tyranny’	 for	 seventeenth‐century	 England	 and	
pointed	to	a	certain	subordinate	accusation,	 tracing	back	to	Platonic	pleonexia,	which	meant	enslaving	oneself	 to	 ‘a	
disordering	of	the	soul,	manifested	by	a	licentious	grasping,	rapacity’	that	ultimately	leads	to	violence	and	cruelty	and	
the	 enslavement	of	others,	 i.e.	 unrestricted	 corruption.	This	 fear	of	 ‘licentious	 rapacity	 and	 systematic	 interference	
with	 others’	 became	 embedded	 in	 the	 literature	 triggered	by	 the	 French	 religious	wars	 and	 in	 debates	 concerning	
Charles	 I’s	 ship	money	 tax	of	 the	1630s.	Conal	Condren,	 ‘The	Uses	of	Tyranny,	 and	Liberty	 in	Seventeenth‐Century	
England’	 Louis	 Green	 Lecture	 on	 Intellectual	History	 and	 the	 Social	 history	 of	 Ideas	 for	 2013	 (Melbourne,	 Monash	
University:	Ancora	Press,	2014),	1‐31,	quoted	from	10,	11.		
131	 José	Javier	Ruiz	Ibáñez	and	Gaetano	Sabatini,	 ‘Monarchy	as	Conquest:	Violence,	 Social	Opportunity,	 and	Political	
Stability	in	the	Establishment	of	the	Hispanic	Monarchy’,	The	Journal	of	Modern	History	81:3	(2009),	501‐536.		
132	 In	 the	 Black	 Legend‐literature,	 the	 Spanish	 were	 depicted	 as	 heathen	 and	 demonic,	 and	 King	 Philip	 II	 was	
portrayed	as	sinful,	ambitious	and	greedy,	as	a	tyrant	enslaving	subjects	wherever	he	ruled,	even	more	cruelly	than	
the	Ottomans.	In	both	French	and	Dutch	pamphlets	the	confessional	differences	between	the	Protestant	and	Catholic	
parties	were	 camouflaged.	 Conversely,	 the	 Spanish	were	 depicted	 as	 non‐Christian	 and	 demonic	 derivatives	 of	 the	
barbaric	Moors.	 The	 universal	 claim	 of	 the	 Spanish	 tyranny	was	 dramatically	 portrayed	 by	 their	 dealing	with	 the	
American	Indians	in	the	books	of	Las	Casas,	especially	popular	in	the	Dutch	Republic,	where	they	were	translated	The	
mirror	of	the	Spanish	tyranny	in	the	West	Indies	or	A	short	account	of	the	destruction	of	the	Indies	(1606).	On	French	
Black	 Legend	 literature	 Judith	 Pollmann,	 ‘	 Eine	 natürliche	 Feindschaft:	 Ursprung	 und	 Funktion	 der	 schwarzen	
Legende	 über	 Spanien	 in	 den	 Niederlanden,	 1560‐1581’	 in	 Franz	 Bosbach	 (ed.),	 Feindbilder:	 die	 Darstellung	 des	
Gegners	 in	der	politischen	Publizistik	des	Mittelalters	und	der	Neuzeit	 (Köln	 [etc.]:	 Böhlau	 1992),	 73‐93.	 For	 French	
Black	 Legend	 literature	 read	 pages	 84‐87,	 and	 for	 Dutch	 pamphlets	 read	 pages	 88‐92;	 Van	 Gelderen,	 ‘Universal	
Monarchy’,	56.		






use	 in	 his	 writings.	 During	 the	 1620s	 and	 1630s,	 Rohan	 faced	 resurgent	 Catholicism,	 the	




office,	 Rohan	 wrote	 De	 l’interest	 and	 handed	 it	 over	 to	 Cardinal	 Richelieu	 in	 1634.	 The	 ex‐








Directly	after	his	assertion	of	 interest	 ruling	princes	and	 the	 irrelevance	of	classical	history	 to	
interpret	 interest	 of	 state,	 Rohan	 declared	 that	 the	 Bourbon‐French	 and	 Habsburg‐Spanish	
dynasties	were	 the	 two	 great	 powers	 in	 Christendom.	 They	 functioned	 as	 opposite	 poles	 and	
consequently	decided	the	faith	of	the	other	princes	in	the	European	theatre	of	war.	According	to	








Being	 the	 opposite	 pole	 of	 Spain,	 Bourbon‐France	 attempted	 to	 counterpoise	 this	 Spanish	
design,	but	as	it	becomes	clear	to	the	reader,	this	was	not	undertaken	effectively.	Rohan	claimed	
that	 ‘interest	 (as	 it	 hath	 beene	 well	 or	 ill	 followed)	 hath	 caused	 the	 ruine	 of	 some,	 or	 the	
greatnesse	of	others’136	and,	therefore,	he	would	describe	the	‘true	interest’	of	Bourbon‐France	









their	 corrupted	 ministers.	 Behind	 this	 seemingly	 objective	 and	 secular	 interest	 analysis	 of	
European	 ‘states’	 lies	his	satiric	account	of	 the	 interest	of	 the	Spanish	monarchy:	 its	desire	 for	
establishing	 a	 ‘new	 monarchy’,	 a	 tyrannical	 control	 predominantly	 by	 dissimulating	 piety,	
backed	by	a	highly	developed	machinery	of	war	and	intelligence.	This	interest	analysis	enabled	








only	 could	 be	 opposed	 by	 the	 French	 monarchy	 taking	 up	 arms.137	 Consequently,	 he	 starts	
l’Interest	with	 ‘the	 interest	of	 Spaine’.	He	opened	with	emphasising	 the	excellent	 geographical	
position	 of	 the	 Spanish	 monarchy,	 being	 ‘the	 head	 of	 Europe’	 and	 protected	 by	 its	 natural	
boarders	(the	Ocean,	the	Mediterranean	Sea	and	the	Pyrenees)	while	‘so	many	States	spread	in	
diverse	parts	of	the	world’	depended	‘upon	this	great	Country	so	well	situated.’	He	continues	by	
referring	 to	 the	 late	 King	 Philip	 II,	 who	 ‘attempted	 to	 extend	 this	 vast	 power	 to	 the	 top	 of	
greatnesse.’	He	ironically	praised	Philip’s	statesmanship:		
	







often	 succeed	 ‘these	 great	 Conquerrours’	 and	 the	 conquered	 citizens	 tend	 not	 to	 forget	 their	
once	beloved	‘libertie’.139	Machiavelli	states	that	the	conqueror	could	set	up	an	indirect	rule	and	
allow	them	to	 live	under	 their	own	 laws,	but	believes	 it	more	efficient	 to	 live	 there	himself	or	












this	 counsel	 in	 believing	 that	 the	 once	 free	 citizens	 ‘are	 easily	 carried	 to	 any	 change,	 seeing	











‘he	 fixed	 the	 seat	of	his	dominion	 in	Spaine,	 that	he	might	 from	 thence	 conuiegh	
warmth	 to	 the	 members	 loosened	 from	 his	 body,	 and	 might	 with	 more	 ease	
(conseruing	peace	by	his	presence)	trouble	all	the	rest	of	Europe.’145			
	
Furthermore,	Philip’s	statecraft	had	resulted	 in	 the	growth	of	 the	Spanish	monarchy	 to	such	a	
great	extent	that	his	successors	had	easily	carried	on	his	plans	for	universal	hegemony.146	This	
picture	 functions	 as	 a	warning	 for	 France,	 not	 only	 against	 the	 dangers	 of	 being	 absorbed	 by	
Spanish	rapacity	but	also,	once	conquered,	of	not	being	able	to	overthrow	the	Spanish	universal	
tyrant.	 Rohan’s	 use	 of	 ‘domination’	 (also	 in	 original	 French	 text)	 may	 refer	 to	 ‘rule’,	 but	 is	
additionally	 suggestive	 of	 the	 Latin	 dominatus,	 a	 term	 in	 the	 ambit	 of	 tyranny	 and	 universal	
monarchy.147	 This	 negative	 association	 of	 ‘dominion’	 with	 universal	 aspirations,	 seeking	 an	
unrestricted	mastership	or	lordship	over	other	sovereigns,	stood	in	contrast	with	Rohan’s	outcry	



























affairs	 in	 other	 ‘states’	 by	 ambassadors,	 monks	 and	 priests	 and	 by	 bribery	 of	 counsellors	 of	
foreign	princes;	3)	signing	(secret)	treaties,	feigning	striving	for	peace,	striking	other	dynasties	
when	 they	 least	 expect	 it,	 and	 acting	 as	 mediator	 between	 other	 princes	 in	 conflict;	 4)	
maintaining	 a	 constant	 state	 of	 armament	 to	 repress	 their	 own	 subjects,	 to	 intimidate	 other	




and	by	 the	 application	of	 them,	Rohan	was	 able	 to	 construe	 all	Habsburg‐Spain’s	 policies	 and	
conduct	as	one	great	evil	strategy,	consequently	hyperbole	passes	for	simple	analysis.	
Religion	was	 Spain’s	 first	maxim,	 its	 key	 principle	 in	 obtaining	 universal	 dominion	 by	
politics	of	dissimilation.	Rohan	underlined	 the	controversial	Machiavellian	and	Tacitist	 idea	of	






Under	 their	 proclaimed	 zeal	 for	 Catholicism,	 Spanish	 rulers	 and	 their	 agents	 ought	 to	 seek	
support	from	the	Pope	to	strengthen	its	power	and	stir	up	conflicts	in	other	countries	to	destroy	
them	 from	 within.	 Rohan	 counselled	 that	 the	 Spanish	 monarchy	 should	 incite	 civil	 war	 by	
stimulating	openly	 the	French	crown	to	persecute	 its	Protestant	subjects	but	at	 the	same	time	
secretly	 supporting	 the	 rebellious	 groups	 amongst	 the	 Protestants.	With	 the	 English	 King	 he	
ought	 to	make	 peace	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 his	 possessions	 in	 the	 Indies	 and	 to	 infiltrate	 in	 the	
realm	 by	 setting	 up	 Jesuits	 schools,	 giving	 free	 education	 to	 boys	 in	 the	 Catholic	 religion	 and	
training	 them	to	become	martyrs	 for	 the	Spanish	monarchy	against	 their	own	English	king.	 In	
the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire,	 with	 its	 powerful	 Protestant	 princes,	 the	 Spanish	 ruler	 ought	 to	






Protestants,	 and	 he	 should	 augment	 it	 from	 their	 spoyles,	 vnder	 pretence	 of	 Religion,	 and	 a	
desire	 thereby	 to	defend	Christendome	against	 the	Turks.’150	 In	 the	Swiss	 cantons,	 the	Spanish	





during	the	French	Religious	Wars	and	 likewise	 for	Catholic	groups	 in	certain	Swiss	cantons	as	
the	much	fought	over	Valtelline	passes.	Similarly,	this	counsel	could	be	witnessed	in	the	Spanish	
involvement	 in	 the	 Thirty	 Year’s	War	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	Habsburgs	 emperors	 and	 during	 the	
religious	 and	 political	 upheavals	 of	 the	 Twelve	 Year’s	 Truce	 in	 the	 Dutch	 Republic	 (1609–
1621).151	The	unstated	background	of	events	marshalled	through	the	use	of	maxims	would	have	
been	 familiar	 to	 readers;	 it	 constitutes	 a	 form	 of	 aposiopesis	 ‐leaving	 silent	 an	 obvious	 or	
inevitable	conclusion,	a	 rhetorical	 restraint	 from	a	 total	unmasking	of	 the	enemy.	At	 the	same	
time,	Rohan’s	preference	for	an	imperative	idiom,	what	ought	to	be	done	in	the	true	interests	of	
Habsburg	 Spain,	 was	 a	 less	 objective	 analysis	 than	 a	 form	 of	 Devil’s	 advocacy	 ‐a	 pretence	 of	
honest	counsel	in	order	to	expose	and	condemn.	
Rohan	devoted	fewer	pages	to	the	other	four	maxims	of	the	Spanish	interest,	intelligence,	
negotiation	 of	 treaties,	 permanent	 armament	 and	 reputation.	 Compared	 to	 the	 maxim	 of	
religion,	 these	descriptions	were	not	clarified	by	 indirect	examples	of	polities	that	the	Spanish	
monarchy	 recently	 had	 disrupted.	 Nevertheless,	 these	 four	 recommended	 techniques	 all	
encompassed,	 although	 not	 explicitly	 stated,	 calculated	 political	 action	 of	 dissimulation,	 by	
which,	 and	again	Rohan	 let	 the	 reader	 conclude	 this,	 the	Spanish	monarchy	would	 attempt	 to	
bring	 down	 the	 European	 polities,	 and	 force	 them	under	 its	 tyrannical	 rule.	 The	 third	maxim	
(negotiation	 of	 treaties)	 dictates	 that	 the	 Spanish	 ruler	 ‘must	 allway	 shewe	 a	 desire	 of	 peace,	
thereby	to	cast	others	asleepe,	and	in	the	meane	time	prepare	himselfe	to	warre,	for	to	surprise	




armament,	 i.e.	 the	 fourth	 maxim,	 was	 to	 construct	 a	 reputation	 of	 invincibility	 towards	 the	
Spanish	subjects	as	well	al	neighbouring	princes	and	to	attack	the	latter	by	surprise.	Rohan	also	













hiding	 behind	 a	 careful	 constructed	 reputation	 as	 guarantor	 of	 peace	 and	 defender	 of	 the	
Catholic	faith.	
Rohan	 added	 ‘reputation’	 as	 the	 last	maxim	 that	 depended	 on	 the	 first	 four,	 but	 as	 he	














to	 advantage	 herself	 in	 Treaties)’	 and	 ‘estate	 of	 her	 armes’.158	 The	 Spanish	 rulers	 built	 their	
reputation	upon	these	prudent	maxims.	Rohan	concluded	his	account	of	the	Spanish	interest	by	
warning	 the	 reader	of	 the	nature	of	 the	 Spanish	 reputation;	 ‘From	all	 these	 things	 results	 the	
reputation	of	Spaine.	Her	interest	is,	to	manage	well	this	pietie.’159	The	designs	of	Habsburg‐Spain	
were	much	greater	than	those	of	other	rulers	and	therefore	the	Spanish	rulers	had	to	be	extra	
careful	 in	managing	 their	 reputation,	 counselled	Rohan	 ironically.160	The	 reader	had	 to	derive	
from	 this	 counsel	 that	 the	 Spanish	 monarchy	 illicitly	 treated	 religion	 as	 a	 mere	 political	


















political	 action.162	 This	 disregard	 of	moral,	 religious	 and	 legal	 considerations	 in	 unveiling	 the	
‘true	interest’	of	the	Spanish	ruler	(dissimulating	piety	and	a	zeal	 for	Catholicism),	exemplified	
by	true	events,	is	to	turn	interest	to	satiric	effect:	in	line	with	the	genre	of	critical	current‐affairs	












by	 two	 seas,	 seemes	 to	 be	 inuited	 by	 nature	 to	 oppose	 it	 selfe	 against	 the	
proceedings	 of	 this	 puissant	 Neighbourhood.	 For	 shee	 appeares	 like	 a	 banke	
against	 this	 torrent,	 and	 the	 opportunitie	 of	 her	 situation	 is	 such,	 that	 shee	may	
hinder	 the	distribution	of	 the	head	 to	 the	members	 of	 the	Monarchie	which	does	
oppugne	her.’163			
	
France	 dispatched	 the	 head	 of	 the	 Spanish	 political	 body	 from	 its	 members	 by	 which	 Rohan	
indirectly	 referred	 to	 the	 Spanish	 Low	 Countries,	 its	 Italian	 possessions	 and	 the	 dynastically	
related	 lands	 of	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire.	 The	 hindrance	 of	 France	 for	 the	 Spanish	 dynastic	
agglomerate	 was,	 however,	 ‘not	 sufficient’	 to	 oppose	 the	 Spanish	 design	 to	 universal	
monarchy.164	Therefore	Rohan	stated	that	‘the	interest	of	France	is,	to	take	all	the	counter‐course	
                                                            
161	 Rohan,	A	Treatise	of	 the	 Interest	of	 the	Princes	and	 States	of	Christendome,	 12;	Henri	 de	 Rohan,	De	 l’intérêt	des	








In	 stark	 opposition	 to	 his	 ironic	 praising	 of	 Philip	 II,	 Rohan	 heralded	 the	 late	Huguenot	 King	
Henry	IV	for	‘having	better	vnderstood	them	[maximes]	then	any	other	before	him,	(…)	he	first	
confirmed	 the	 true	 interest	 of	 France,	 which	 is	 to	 thwart	 or	 counterpoint	 Spaine	 in	 all	 these	
points.’166	 From	 all	 this,	 the	 reader	 should	 conclude	 that	 the	 current	 French	 King,	 Louis	 XIII,	
should	 oppose	 Habsburg‐Spain	 by	 its	 own	 maxims.	 Citing	 Henry	 as	 an	 exemplum	 for	 Louis	
personifies	 the	diminution	of	 confessional	difference	and	suggests	a	dynastic	 thread	 to	 tie	 the	
‘true	interest’	of	the	French	 ‘state’	together,	as	Collins	argued	that	the	French	king	became	the	
source	 of	 the	 newly	 constructed	 fictive	 unity	 of	 the	 French	 ‘state’,	 justified	 in	 terms	 of	 its	
‘interest	of	state’.167	
Regarding	its	first	maxim,	the	French	monarchy	ought	to	show	all	Catholics	‘the	venome	
hidden	 vndes	 the	 same’,	 i.e.	 under	 the	 Spanish	 zeal	 for	 Catholicism	 the	 Spanish	 monarchy	
persecuted	Protestants	for	its	own	advantage.	Similarly	to	Richelieu’s	interest	argumentation	for	
an	anti‐Habsburg	policy,	Rohan	claimed	that	 the	authority	of	 the	pope	 ‘never	has	more	 lustre,	
then	wehen	 the	power	of	 the	Christian	Princes	and	states	 is	ballanced’.168	The	great	difference	
between	Rohan’s	and	the	Cardinal	Richelieu’	defences	for	an	anti‐Habsburg	policy	was	the	fact	
that	Rohan	did	not	present	it	as	a	principal	Catholic	duty;	and	furthermore,	he	painted	rather	an	
evil	 picture	 of	 the	 Spanish	 motives	 for	 persecuting	 Protestants:	 ‘to	 let	 the	 Court	 of	 Rome	
vnderstand	 that	 the	 hopes	 which	 Spaine	 giues	 her	 to	 augment	 her	 treasures	 by	 the	 ruine	 of	
Protestants,	 is	 not	 but	 to	 further	 her	 designe	 towards	 the	Monarchie’.169	 From	 this	 the	 reader	
might	 infer	 that	 not	 only	 did	 the	 Spanish	monarchy	 persecute	 Protestants	 solely	 for	 political	
gain,	but	that	also	the	Pope	had	been	duped	into	serving	Spain’s	interest.	As	Rohan	warned:	‘the	
Pope	must	become	her	Servant’.170	Thus	the	Spanish	desire	for	universal	monarchy	constituted	a	
political	 and	 military	 hegemony,	 and	 not	 at	 all	 a	 spiritual	 one.	 Secondly,	 the	 reader	 would	
understand	that	the	French	maxim	of	religion	constituted	essentially	a	necessary	defence	of	the	
rule	of	law	in	all	Christian	polities,	Catholic	and	Protestant.	Besides	convincing	other	Catholics	of	
Spain’s	 religious	 pretexts,	 the	 French	monarchy	 should	 assure	 Protestant	 rulers	 and	 regimes	
that	 it	 was	 not	 intent	 on	 persecuting	 their	 Protestant	 subjects,	 but	 rather	 converting	 them.	













	 Interestingly,	 the	 following	 three	 maxims	 of	 France,	 i.e.	 intelligence,	 diplomacy	 and	
armament,	 constituted	 the	 equivalent	 of	 the	 Spanish	 ones	 in	 terms	 of	 contents.	 However,	 the	




across	 Europe,	 to	 construct	 new	 alliances	 and	 ultimately	 to	 block	 the	 Spanish	 methods	 of	
intelligence	 at	 every	European	 court.	 Rohan	offered	 the	 same	 advice	 for	 the	 third	maxime:	 ‘it	
ought	not	to	be	suffered,	that	Spaine	meddle	in	any	Treatie,	but	that	France	also	step	between	on	






Especially	 the	 last	 maxim	 shows	 a	 rather	 cynical	 and	 pessimistic	 view	 of	 politics	






‘So	 as	 that	 France	 ought	 to	 cutt	 off	 all	 vnnecessarie	 expences,	 and	 be	 allwaies	




implement,	but	he	may	have	been	alluding	 to	crippling	 interest	 rates	 from	war	debts	 that	had	
weakened	the	French	Crown	in	the	1620s.175	He	ended	his	account	of	the	interest	of	France	by	











survive	 the	 European	 war	 competition	 in	 this	 way.	 This	 would	 lead	 to	 France	 opposing	 the	
Spanish	interest	of	carefully	managing	its	reputation	of	the	most	pious	monarchy,	by	gaining	the	
reputation	‘as	the	bullwarke	of	Christian	libertie.’176		





Catholic	 Spanish	monarchy.	 In	Rohan’s	De	 l’Interest	 the	 ‘state’	 as	 a	persona	 ficta	 is	 not	 clearly	
witnessed,	 yet	we	do	 find	 the	more	 common	definition	 for	 state	 as	 the	 political	 standing	 of	 a	
ruler.	 The	political	 actions	were	 still	 undertaken	by	princes,	 not	princes	 as	 representatives	 of	
states	as	legal	persons	as	becomes	clear	in	the	introduction:	‘to	consider	well	the	interest	of	the	
Princes	of	 this	 time’,	 that	 is	 ‘the	howses	 (sic.)	 of	France	and	Spaine’	 and	 the	 ‘other	Princes’.177	
Moreover	 as	 argued	 in	 the	 introduction,	 speaking	 of	 a	 ‘Spaine’	 and	 a	 ‘France’	 was	 a	 useful	
shorthand	 for	 rulers	 and	 did	 not	 symbolised	 the	 existence	 of	 institutionalised	 bureaucratic	
states.	For	 instance	Rohan	wrote:	 ‘And	though	all	Princes	hold	 for	a	general	maxime,	 that	 they	




Princes	and	States	 is	ballanced’;	 ‘and	 the	other	Christian	Princes	and	States’.179	 It	 could	be	 that	
here	 Rohan	 rather	 referred	 to	 princes	 and	 other	 prevailing	 regimes	 or	 particular	 forms	 of	
government	as	republics.	Moreover,	 it	seems	that	Rohan	also	referred	to	states	as	the	political	





‘William	of	Nassau	Prince	of	Orange,	who	alone	 in	 this	Age	had	 the	honour	 to	 found	a	












haue	 euer	 affected	 their	 libertie	 more	 then	 their	 very	 liues,	 he	 could	 not	 alter	 the	
conditions	whereupon	they	first	joyned	themselues	vnto	him.’181		
	
Over	 all,	 the	 variation	 in	 Rohan’s	 usage	 provides	 little	 evidence	 to	 justify	 to	De	 l’interest	 the	
notion	of	the	state	as	a	legal	person	distinguishable	from	both	ruler	and	ruled.		
After	unveiling	the	true	interest	of	Spain	that	Rohan	stated	ought	to	be	opposed	in	every	
maxim	by	France,	he	treated	the	 interests	of	 ‘states’	 that	were	 linked	to	the	Spanish‐Habsburg	
dynasty	either	by	alliances	or	by	warfare.	So	France’s	interest	was	followed	up	by	‘the	Interest	of	
the	 Princes	 of	 Italie’,	 ‘the	 interest	 of	 the	 Sea	 of	 Rome’	 and	 ‘the	 Interest	 of	 Germanie’,	 and	 he	
ended	 his	 first	 part	with	 ‘the	 interest	 of	 the	 Swisses	 and	 of	 the	 United	 Provinces	 of	 the	 Low	
Countries’	and	‘the	interest	of	England’.182	For	the	argument	of	this	chapter	it	suffices	to	say	that	
Rohan	 presented	 England	 as	 the	 balancing	 party	 between	 Spain	 and	 France,	 a	 counsel	 that	
recurred	 in	many	 later	 interest	 analyses	 such	 as	 the	 one	 by	 Valkenier.	 Every	 interference	 of	
Spain	in	the	Italian	polities	ought	to	be	hindered	for	fear	of	France’s	encirclement.		In	line	with	
Richelieu’s	reason	of	state	arguments	Rohan	believed	 the	Papal	States	 to	be	 the	beneficiary	of	
anti‐Habsburgs	 policy;	 and	 he	 treats	 them	 in	 a	 way	 at	 one	 with	 the	 Gallican	 defence	 of	 an	
independent	French	Church	as	a	political	entity.	Regarding	the	Holy	Roman	Empire,	the	greatest	
threat	 to	 its	 ‘libertie’,183	 was	 the	 Austrian	 branch	 of	 the	 Spanish‐Habsburgs,	 who	 made	 the	
imperial	 crown	 de	 facto	 hereditary	 and	 was	 determined	 to	 usurp	 the	 entire	 empire	 under	
Habsburg	 rule.	 The	 Swiss	 Confederation	 and	 the	 Dutch	 Republic	 served	 as	 two	 arms	 of	 the	
Empire,	both	were	feared	by	others,	and	were	defenders	of	liberty	(the	Swiss	as	mercenaries	for	
others	and	 the	Dutch	as	defenders	of	 their	own	 liberty).	Both	are	prosperous,	 since	 the	Swiss	
have	enriched	 themselves	by	peace	and	 the	Dutch	by	 the	continuance	of	warfare.	Each	should	
therefore	 ally	 itself	with	 France	 against	 Spain.	 Rohan	 underlines	 the	 importance	 of	moderate	


















attention	 to	 this	 second	 and	 larger	 part	 of	 the	 book.184	 Herein,	 Rohan	 presented	 seven	
discourses,	which	represented	‘principall	affaires	agitated	in	Christendome	for	the	space	of	fiftie	











domestic	 and	 international	 level,	 as	 Meinecke	 and	 Devetak	 argued.	 Moreover,	 instead	 of	
disqualifying	 these	 princes	 by	 their	 lack	 of	 listed	 virtues	 (as	 in	mirror‐of‐prince	 literature	 or	
reason	 of	 state	 writings	 focusing	 on	 the	 moral	 person	 of	 the	 ruler),	 Rohan	 examines	 recent	
historical	conflicts/crises	and	clearly	outlines	the	failed	interest	management	of	the	princes	and	








Spanish	 monarchy	 emerged	 as	 the	 instigator	 or	 at	 least	 the	 supporter	 of	 conflicts,	 that	 had	















led	to	rivalling	 interest	groups,	 i.e.	Queen	Catherine	de	Medici	against	the	princes	of	 the	blood	
and	secondly,	between	the	noble	houses	of	De	Guise	and	De	Montmorancy,	seeking	control	over	
the	Crown.	 Rohan	 led	 the	 reader	 to	 believe	 that	 confessional	 differences	were	 subordinate	 to	
these	 power	 struggles.	 As	 he	 summed	 up	 the	 series	 of	 confessional	 conflicts	 and	 monstrous	
events	in	a	single	diminishing	sentence:		
	
‘Likewise	 there	 was	 amongst	 them	 difference	 of	 Religion.	 The	 warres	 about	 Religion	
were	great	and	bloodie,	and	lasted	euen	to	the	death	of	Charles	the	ninth,	and	his	brother	
Henry	 the	 third	 succeeded	 him.	 He	 was	 of	 age	 capable	 to	 gouerne,	 he	 had	 goodly	
qualities,	and	gaue	hopes	of	a	happy	Reigne.’191		
	
However,	 Henry	 III	 preferred	 to	 ‘plunge	 himselfe	 in	 idlenesse	 and	 pleasures,	 [rather]	 then	 to	
reigne	well.’	Immediately	hereafter	Rohan	introduced	the	second	Henry,	Duc	de	Guise:	‘a	Prince	
endowed	 with	 great	 qualities,	 and	 full	 of	 loftie	 thoughts’.192	 Since	 Henri	 III	 and	 his	 brother,	
Francis	duke	of	Anjou	and	Alençon,	did	not	provide	an	heir	to	the	throne	and	‘the	first	Princes	of	
the	 blood’	 professed	 Protestantism	 (referring	 to	 Henry	 de	 Bourbon),	 Henry	 de	 Guise	 saw	
opportunity	 to	 ‘aspire	 vnto	 the	Royaltie,	 and	 to	 get	 thither,	makes	 himselfe	 Protecteur	 of	 the	




188	Moreover,	most	discourses	 explicitly	 emphasised	 that	 since	 the	 Spanish	power	had	 rose	 considerably,	 it	was	 in	















194	 Dewald,	 Status,	 power,	 and	 identity	 in	 early	modern	 France,	 75.	 Rohan’s	 analysis	 ‘treated	 plans	 of	 regicide	 and	
usurpation	 as	 expressions	 of	 lofty	 ambition	 and	 greatness	 of	 spirit;	 it	 praised	 a	 likely	 organizer	 of	 the	 St.	
Bartholomew’s	Day	massacre	of	France’s	Protestant	nobles,	an	event	that	had	touched	Rohan’s	own	family	and	still	

















He	describes	 the	events,	 the	assassinations	of	Henry	de	Guise,	Henry	 III	and	 the	coronation	of	
Henry	 IV,	who	by	 the	 changing	 situation	of	his	office,	quits	his	 formerly	 followed	 interest	and	
embraces	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 French	 ‘state’,	 which	 the	 reader	 should	 understand	 as	 proper	
interest	 management,	 by	 placing	 his	 own	 factional	 interest	 under	 the	 interest	 of	 ‘state’	 once	
crowned	King	of	France.	Henry	IV	was	however	still	thwarted	by	the	League,	but	especially	by	
the	 Spanish	 King	 Philip	 II,	 who	 did	 not	 acknowledge	 Henry’s	 kingship	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 his	
Protestant	 confession.	 The	 following	 pages	 Rohan	 devoted	 to	 Philip’s	 strategies	 to	 obstruct	
Henry	 IV	 by	 supporting	 the	 League	 and	 Henry’s	 other	 enemies	 with	 subsidies	 and	 troops,	
inciting	 the	 Pope	 to	 excommunicate	 Henry,	 even	 not	 stopping	 when	 Henry	 IV	 converted	 to	
Catholicism	and	the	Pope,	although	for	merely	political	reasons,	acknowledged	Henry	as	King	of	
France.	 Eventually	 Henry	 declared	 war	 against	 Philip,	 obtaining	 many	 successes	 for	 France,	
which	 ended	 in	 the	 peace	 of	 Vervins	 signed	 in	 1598,	 after	which	Philip	 soon	died.198	Again,	 a	
seemingly	simple	interest	analysis	covers	Rohan’s	criticism,	and	the	reader	must	conclude	that	
Philip’s	actions	were	solely	motivated	by	the	Spanish	design	for	universal	monarchy,	to	conquer	
the	 French	 monarchy	 by	 inciting	 civil	 war	 and	 factional	 conflicts.	 Rohan	 leaves	 silent	 this	





















couered	 vnder	 the	 vaile	 of	 Pietie,	 and	 of	 his	 great	 zeale	 to	 the	 Catholike	 Religion.	 He	




tyrant,	whose	 fault	 it	was	wanting	 France	 entirely,	 instead	 of	 dividing	 the	monarchy	 amongst	
factional	League‐nobles	after	the	death	of	Henry	de	Guise.	By	such	a	distribution,	Philip		
	
‘could	more	 easily	 reduce	 them	 [League‐nobles]	 to	 his	 owne	will.	 […]	 And	 afterwards	
vpon	 the	differences	 that	are	wont	 to	happen	betweene	usurpers,	 it	would	haue	beene	
farre	 more	 easie	 for	 him	 to	 gett	 by	 peece‐meale,	 what	 he	 would	 haue	 carried	 all	 at	
once.’202		
	






from	 the	1630s,	 such	 as	Rohan’s	pivotal	De	 l’interest,	 not	per	 se	 reviewing	 such	matters.	 This	
should	 not	 be	 interpreted	 as	modern	 secularization	 or	 a	 diminution	 of	 religious	 controversy.	
Rohan	sidestepped	confessional	arguments	not	because	of	their	irrelevance,	but	because	of	their	









participated	 in	 contemporary	French	debates	 about	 foreign	policy	 and	domestic	 affairs,	 about	




competition	 driven	 by	 understandings	 of	 their	 interests.	 A	 ruler’s	 standing	 in	 the	 military	
constellation	determined	political	actions,	certainly	not	religion,	which	was	used	only	as	a	mere	
political	 instrument	 as	 by	 Habsburg‐Spain,	 or	 could	 shape	 a	 certain	 political	 faction	 as	 the	













In	 1662,	 there	was	 outrage	 in	 The	Netherlands	 at	 the	 publication	 of	 Interest	 van	Holland	ofte	




1650	 until	 1672	 they	 were,	 however,	 excluded	 from	 this	 office	 by	 Holland	 and	 most	 other	
provinces	 during	 the	 ‘First	 Stadholderless	 Era’,	 or	 the	 epoch	 of	 ‘True	 Freedom’	 as	 some	
contemporaries	 celebrated	 it.205	 The	 anti‐Orangist	 polemic	 of	 Interest	 of	 Holland	 produced	 a	
vigorous	 political	 controversy.206	 Its	 blunt	 anti‐Orangism	 and	 fierce	 anti‐clericalism	 attracted	
ridicule	 and	 rebuke;	 its	 author	 was	 condemned	 for	 his	 ‘false	 calumnies	 and	 adorned	 lies’,	
‘hazardous	writings’,	and	described	as	a	 ‘new	born	Dutch	Cromwell	alias	Leiden	Quaker’	and	a	
mere	‘favorite’	of	Johan	de	Witt,	the	de	facto	leader	of	the	contested	stadholderless	regime.	207			
Pieter	 de	 la	 Court	wrote	 Interest	 van	Holland	during	 an	 Orangist	 revival	 in	 the	 Dutch	
Republic	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	1660s.	The	Stuart	Restoration	across	 the	North	Sea	and	King	
Charles	 II’s	 support	 for	 his	 young	 nephew	William	 of	 Orange	 gave	 rise	 to	 high	 expectations	




has	 predominantly	 focused	 on	 their	 ‘republicanism’,	 representing	 it	 as	 ‘the	 first	 unequivocal	
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This	 chapter	 argues	 the	 alleged	 ‘republicanism’	 or	 ‘anti‐monarchism’	 of	 De	 la	 Court	
needs	 to	 be	 reinterpreted	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 new	 interpretative	 heuristic	 tool	 ‘war	 despotism’,	
contemporary	polemics	attacking	a	 system	of	 rule	 that	by	pursuing	costly	warfare	 robbed	 the	






of	 ‘interest’	was	 developed	within	 and	 from	 the	 casuistic	 and	 legitimating	 idiom	of	 ‘reason	 of	
state’.	Reason	of	state	entailed	the	claim	that	in	cases	of	necessity	rulers	had	room	to	manoeuvre	
beyond	 the	 bounds	 of	 normal	 legal	 and	 moral	 constraints.	 This	 particularly	 applied	 to	 the	
emergency	 circumstances	 brought	 forth	 by	 the	 intensification	 of	warfare,	 that	 in	 the	 name	 of	
interest	 allowed	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 to	 be	 put	 aside	 and	 finances	 raised	 by	 extraordinary	means.	
Starting	 in	 the	 1630s,	 authors	 like	 Rohan,	 began	 to	 consider	 the	 characteristics	 of	 various	
dynastic	agglomerates,	 from	which	allegedly	objective	 ‘true	 interests	of	states’	of	Europe	were	
derived.	 In	doing	 so,	 they	could	defend	one	political	 faction	as	most	 likely	 to	pursue	a	 certain	
‘foreign’	 policy,	 consequently	 delegitimising	 another.	 From	 the	 1650s	 onwards,	 such	 interest	
analyses	 often	were	 complemented	with	 explicit	 criticism	 of	 princely	 coercion	 and	 sovereign	
authority	 and	defences	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 For	 the	English	 case,	 the	 research	by	Alan	Houston	
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republicanism	 compared	 to	 the	 English	 variant	 was	 ‘more	 coherently	 radical,	 (…)	 more	 emphatically	 anti‐
monarchical,	anti‐hierarchical	and	more	concerned	with	equality	than	English	republicanism’.	
212	Wyger	Velema,	‘“That	a	Republic	is	Better	than	a	Monarchy”:	Anti‐Monarchism	in	Early	Modern	
Dutch	 Political	 Thought’,	 in	 Martin	 van	 Gelderen	 and	 Quentin	 Skinner	 (eds.),	 Republicanism:	 A	 Shared	 European	











It	 is,	 as	 Hans	 Blom	 has	 argued,	 ‘easy	 to	 overlook’	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 vocabulary	 of	
reason	of	state	on	contemporary	debates,	since	Dutch	authors	were	divided	over	the	position	of	
the	 prince	 of	 Orange,	 but	 ‘united’	 in	 ‘an	 interest‐based	 conception	 of	 politics’.215	 Moreover,	
historians	 tend	to	examine	Dutch	pamphlet	wars	solely	within	a	national	 framework;	 ‘None	of	
them	refer	to	the	fact	that	the	major	political	debates	originated	in	the	context	of	international	
warfare.’216	The	fiercely	competitive	conflicts	of	European	rulers	that	produced	war‐driven	and	
debt‐ridden	 regimes	 is	precisely	 the	historical	 context	 in	which	we	will	 examine	De	 la	Court’s	
usage	of	the	language	of	reason	of	state	in	Interest	van	Holland.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	
small	 Dutch	 Republic	 participated	 in	 this	 competition.217	 Due	 to	 almost	 incessant	 warfare,	 it	
experienced	 an	 unprecedented	 level	 of	 public	 debt,	 and	 consequently	 an	 unparalleled	 rise	 of	
taxation,	 sale	 of	 public	 loans	 and	 annuities.	 Taxation	 per	 head	 was	 considerably	 higher	 in	
Holland	than	in	other	European	polities	and	this	province	paid	for	more	than	half	of	the	Union’s	
war	budget.218	Consequently,	 the	central	 issue	for	Dutch	 ‘opinion’	 in	the	1650s	and	1660s	was	
                                                            




Van	 spel	 en	 spelers	 (The	 Hague:	 Martinus	 Nijhoff,	 1982)	 and	 Ernst	 H.	 Kossmann,	 ‘Some	 late	 17th‐century	 Dutch	
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157–182	 and	 Hans	 W.	 Blom,	 ‘The	 Republican	 Mirror,	 The	 Dutch	 Idea	 of	 Europe,’	 in	 Anthony	 Pagden	 (ed.),	 The	
Languages	of	Political	Theory	in	Early‐Modern	Europe	(Cambridge;	Cambridge	University	Press,	1999),	91‐115.	
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the	stadholderate	 linked	 to	 the	pursuit	of	warfare:	whether	 to	pursue	costly	offensive	warfare	
against	the	grand	European	dynasties	under	the	military	leadership	of	the	prince	of	Orange	and,	
by	 implication,	 to	sustain	 large	 land	 forces	and	high	taxes,	or	 to	strive	 for	peace	with	a	strong	
fleet	 to	protect	 the	prosperous	 trade	without	 the	need	 for	 an	Orange‐Stadholder	 and	 ‐captain	
general.	These	debates	were	informed	by	the	popular	European	idiom	of	‘interest	(of	state)’.219		
De	 la	Court	wrote	principally	as	 a	 citizen	of	 the	Dutch	Republic,	which	was	 ruled	by	a	
minority	 regime.	 Johan	 De	 Witt	 estimated	 that	 only	 0.1	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 common	 populace	
supported	the	stadholderless	regime.220	The	province	of	Holland	constituted	a	closed	oligarchy	
of	regenten,	 controlled	by	certain	 families,	who	had	made	 their	 fortunes	 through	commerce	 in	
the	early	seventeenth	century	and	divided	amongst	themselves	offices	 in	urban	and	provincial	
councils,	 in	 boards	 of	 trading	 companies	 and	 minor	 offices.	 These	 offices	 were	 viewed	 as	
negotiable	private	property.	The	magistrates	even	asserted	their	political	legitimacy	in	terms	of	
divine	right	and	absolute	entitlement.221	The	Dutch	Republic	became	a	 true	 ‘Royalist	Republic’	
after	 the	 regicide	 of	 King	 Charles	 I	 for	 a	 diverse	 range	 of	 reasons,	 as	 Helmer	 Helmers	 has	
convincingly	 argued	 recently.222	 Civil	 disorder,	 especially	 the	 violent	 and	 enduring	 nature	
witnessed	 in	 the	 English	 Civil	Wars,	was	 greatly	 feared	 and	 in	 the	 Interest	 van	Holland	 De	 la	
Court	persistently	expressed	a	contempt	for	the	ignorant	rabble	easily	incited	to	rebellion.	The	




against	 the	 regime	 for	 a	 complex	number	 of	 reasons,	 but	 often	 conveyed	 through	 support	 for	
Orange.	 This	was	 the	 republican	 reality	 of	De	 la	Court.	 The	historian	Herbert	Rowen	 stressed	
that	 Organist	 pamphleteers	 used	 ‘the	 familiar	 theories	 of	 kingship’	 in	 defence	 of	 an	 Orange‐
stadholderate,	 which	 led	 to	 counterattacks	 on	 the	 royal	 aspirations	 of	 Orange.	 He	 writes:	
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‘Because	 the	 participants	 in	 the	 debate	 knew	 all	 too	 clearly	 what	 was	 intended,	 no	 one	 was	





into	 the	historical	 context	of	 the	Orange	Republic,	 the	 stadholderless	 regime	and	 the	Orangist	







describe	 complaints	 of	 the	 assemblies	 and	 the	published	polemics	 in	 France	 against	 allegedly	
coercive	 practices	 by	 the	 regime,	 which	 through	 the	 pursuit	 of	 costly	 warfare,	 purportedly	
suppressed	and	effectively	enslaved	 the	 subjects.	 It	was	 then	defined	and	used	by	Robert	von	
Friedeburg	 for	 interpreting	 French	 and	 German	 sources	 with	 a	 rather	 more	 systematic	
definition	 in	 mind.226	 Before	 explaining	 this	 further,	 we	 must	 take	 note	 of	 the	 actual	
developments	that	were	addressed	and	the	use	of	the	terminology	in	these	critiques.	As	we	have	
seen	in	the	introduction,	during	the	sixteenth	and	seventeenth	centuries,	European	governments	
were	 transformed	 under	 pressure	 of	 the	 intensification	 of	 warfare	 and	 the	 consequent	
unprecedented	 level	 of	 government	 debt.	 Regimes	 were	 forced	 to	 find	 new	 resources,	 for	
example,	 selling	 offices	 (as	 tax	 farming)	 and	 taking	 out	 high‐interest	 loans.	 While	 new	
officeholders	and	creditors	benefitted	from	the	pursuit	of	warfare,	others,	such	as	the	old	landed	
gentry	and	urban	merchant	elites,	felt	excluded	by	these	changes	in	government.	 
In	 France,	 the	 Crown	 was	 forced	 to	 take	 desperate	 financial	 measures	 to	 meet	 the	
immediate	 problems	 raised	 by	 the	 wars	 with	 the	 Habsburgs.	 From	 the	 1570s,	 especially	 the	
unparalleled	 creation	 and	 sale	 of	 offices	 and	mounting	 governmental	 debt	were	 addressed	 in	
estate	 assemblies	 and	 structural	 reform	demanded.227	King	Henry	 IV	 could	not	 reorganise	 the	
Crown’s	 financial	 infrastructure,	 and,	 as	 mentioned	 in	 the	 chapter	 on	 Rohan,	 even	 had	 to	
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participation	 in	warfare	was	deemed	the	cause	for	the	grave	state	of	 the	monarchy.	 In	various	
assemblies	 the	 nobility	 voiced	 its	 concerns	 and	 appealed	 for	 the	 restoration	 of	 ancient	
constitutional	 agreements	 that	 safeguarded	 the	 common	 good,	 the	 privileges	 and	 property	 of	
elites	and	subjects,	and	the	political	participation	of	nobility.228	
The	 concerns	 generated	 a	 substantial	 polemical	 literature,	 typical	 of	 which	 was	 Jean	
Bourgoin’s	La	Chasse	aux	Larrons	[The	Hunt	for	the	Thieves.],	its	title	proclaiming	the	imperative	
to	 hunt	 down	 the	 rapacious	 financiers	 who	 were	 doing	 so	 much	 damage.229	 Von	 Friedeburg	
stresses	that	in	particular	the	polemics	are	addressed	with	this	term.	Although,	the	practices	that	
generated	 the	 polemics	 might	 be	 seen	 as	 directly	 despotic,	 i.e.	 taking	 money,	 property	 and	
privileges;	 others,	 such	 as	 the	 sale	 of	 offices	 and	 out‐sourcing,	 might	 have	 disastrous	 effects	
were	 not	 even	 slightly	 ‘despotic’.	 From	 the	 1630s,	 the	 adjective	 ‘despotic’	 reappeared	 in	
polemics	 delegitimising	 a	 certain	 system	 of	 rule	 that	 undermined	 the	 property	 rights	 and	
privileges	of	its	subjects.	Authors	conveyed	their	attacks	through	comparisons	with	a	household	
government	that	treated	its	subjects	as	slaves	exemplified	by	specific	practices	of	Ottoman	rule,	
to	 which	 the	 example	 of	 Christian	 Moscow	 was	 often	 added.	 They	 recapitulated	 sixteenth	
century	 tropes	 of	 ‘Turkish	 tyranny’	 and	 applied	 them	 to	 Habsburg‐Spain,	 thus	 depicting	 it	 as	
unchristian	 and	 illegitimate,	 with	 no	 regard	 for	 its	 subjects	 or	 the	 rule	 of	 law.230	 In	 the	
seventeenth	century	the	voiced	 fear	of	domination	and	the	 loss	of	privilege,	became	central	 to	
certain	 practices	 of	 princely	 rule.	 Quentin	 Skinner	 has	 taken	 this	 to	 involve	 the	 defence	 of	 a	
specifically	 neo‐Roman	 liberty,	 revolving	 around	 the	 stark	 contrast	 between	 free	 citizens	 (sui	
iuris)	and	slaves,	those	who	are	subject	to	the	jurisdiction	of	another	and	so	within	the	power	of	
someone	else	(alieni	iuris).231	
Irrespective	 of	 whether	 there	 was	 a	 distinctly	 neo‐Roman	 concept	 of	 liberty,	 the	
polemical	focus	on	‘slavery’	contributed	to	the	erratic	seventeenth‐century	practice	of	conflating	
‘tyrannical’	 with	 household	 i.e.	 ‘despotic’	 rule.	 Aristotle	 had	 distinguished	 both	 notions.	 He	
designated	 tyranny	as	politically	 illegitimate,	pointing	 to	 the	 situation	when	a	particular	 ruler	
pursued	 his	 own	 interests	 instead	 of	 the	 common	 good	 and	 against	 the	 will	 of	 the	 citizens,	
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against	 their	 nature.	 Despotic	 government	 constituted	 an	 arbitrary	 rule,	 but	 was	 legitimate,	
since	 it	 ruled	 according	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 people,	 which	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Persians,	 was	
inherently	 slavish.232	 Although	 medieval	 authors	 sometimes	 echoed	 this	 argument,	 the	 term	
‘despotic’	 almost	disappeared	 in	 the	 fifteenth	 and	 sixteenth	 centuries.	 Its	 seventeenth‐century	
reappearance	was	not	 intended	 to	 restore	 its	precise	meaning	but	 served	polemical	purposes,	
often	 supplemented	 attacks	 on	 tyranny	 and	 underlined	 the	 illegitimate	 system	 of	 rule,	 rather	
than	illicit	circumstances	that	turned	a	ruler	into	a	tyrant.	At	the	end	of	the	seventeenth	century	
the	 noun	 ‘despotism’	 appeared	 with	 its	 qualifications	 of	 ‘arbitrary’,	 ‘absolute’,	 Turkish’,	
‘Tyranny’,	which	was	often	employed	 in	propaganda	against	Louis	XIV’s	 regime,	 and	 found	 its	
quintessential	reflection	in	Montesquieu’s	De	l’esprit	des	lois	(1748).233		
During	the	Fronde,	several	pamphlets	appealed	to	the	historically	established	privileges,	
and	 thus	 the	 right	of	participation	of	 certain	groups	 in	France’s	 constitutional	 framework	and	
distinguished	this	constitution	from	‘despotic’	rule,	as	allegedly	found	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	or	








and	 illustrates	how	French	writing	was	a	partial	 context	 for	Dutch	 reflection.	To	diminish	 the	
threat	 of	 an	 Orange	 restoration	 in	 Holland,	 De	 la	 Court	 needed	 to	 go	 to	 extreme	 lengths.	 He	
warned	the	reader	against	the	prince	of	Orange,	who	would	build	up	a	household	government	
with	 ‘leeches	of	state’235	 that	sucked	 the	resources	out	of	 the	people	of	Holland,	especially	 the	
merchants	 who	 create	 Holland’s	 prosperity.	 An	 Orange‐stadholderate	 would	 systematically	
result	in	the	loss	of	freedoms	and,	ultimately,	in	the	enslavement	of	subjects.	The	De	Witt	regime,	
although	 its	 high	 taxation	 policies	 agitated	 De	 la	 Court,	 safeguarded	 the	 interests	 of	 the	
merchants	best:	‘freedom	of	religion’,	‘freedom	of	trade’	and	‘freedom	of	government’.	Note	that	
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in	 De	 la	 Court’s	 view,	 the	 latter	 essentially	 means	 a	 regime	 without	 an	 Orange‐prince	 as	
stadholder	and	captain	general	 and	 contains	neither	 a	 systematic	 rejection	of	monarchy	nor	 a	
plea	for	political	participation.	De	la	Court	even	writes	in	his	preface	to	Interest	van	Holland	that	
Louis	 XIV’s	 monarchy	 and	 other	 northern	 European	 monarchies	 are	 legitimate	 governments	
opposed	 to	 the	 ‘absolute	 Monarchies’	 that	 ruled	 the	 Asian,	 African	 and	 southern	 European	







In	1618,	 in	 the	 year	 of	 the	 so‐called	 coup	d’état	 of	 stadholder	Maurice	of	Orange,	 Pieter	de	 la	
Court	was	born	 in	Leiden.	His	 father	had	migrated	 from	Flanders	 to	 the	Dutch	Republic	at	 the	
beginning	of	the	century,		and	became	a	successful	entrepreneur	in	Leiden’s	textile	business	by	





embellished	 royal	 entry	 of	 Charles	 I	 in	 London	 in	November	1641.238	Afterwards,	 Pieter	de	 la	
Court	 joined	his	brother	 Johan,	studying	 theology,	at	Leiden	University,	where	Protestant	Late	




and	 sometimes	 even	 made	 substantial	 changes.	 Consequently	 the	 exact	 authorship	 of	 the	
different	writings	of	the	brothers	De	 la	Court	 is	contested.	Twenty‐five	editions	of	six	different	
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despised	 minority)	 while	 at	 that	 the	 same	 time	 they	 owned	 a	 flourishing	 textile	 business	 in	
Leiden,	 the	 centre	 of	 Europe’s	 textile	 industry.	 Not	 surprisingly,	 they	 advocated	 unlimited	
immigration	and	economic	freedom	in	their	writings.242	Apart	 from	commercial	success,	Pieter	





his	political	aspirations.	 	From	then	on,	 the	 family	name	would	be	 ‘De	 la	Court	van	der	Voort’	
with	a	family	estate	‘Meerburg’,	situated	near	Leiden.	In	1670	Pieter	obtained	a	doctorate	in	law	
at	 the	 university	 of	 Orleans	 and	 two	 years	 later	 he	 took	 the	 oath	 as	 lawyer	 of	 the	 court	 of	
Holland.	Sadly	for	him,	 it	was	too	late	to	fill	such	an	office,	 for	the	regime	of	De	Witt	collapsed	
under	the	invading	armies	of	Louis	XIV	and	the	subsequent	revolts	in	the	cities	of	Holland	and	
Zeeland.	 Four	 days	 after	 the	 first	 attempted	 assassination	 of	De	Witt,	 Pieter	 fled	 to	 Antwerp,	
where	he	was	to	stay	for	more	than	a	year.244	There	is	a	long‐standing	but	unconfirmed	rumour	
that	it	was	a	death	threat	that	prompted	De	la	Court	to	flee.	In	the	summer	of	1672	a	group	of	
rebellious	Orangists	 gathered	at	Pieter’s	house	 in	Leiden.	When	 they	did	not	 find	De	 la	Court,	
they	tied	a	dog,	with	its	belly	cut	open,	to	a	tree.	In	the	dog’s	stomach	they	put	a	candle	with	a	
note	stating:	‘La	Court	if	you	do	not	shut	your	mouth,	we	will	treat	you	like	this	dog.’245		
Already	during	his	 lifetime	De	 la	 Court’s	writings	met	with	 harsh	 criticism	and	 strong	











243	 Hans	 W.	 Blom,	 ‘Democratic	 Tendencies	 in	 Anglo‐Dutch	 Republicanism’,	 in	 Dirk	 Wiemann	 and	 Gaby	 Mahlberg	
(eds.),	European	Contexts	for	English	Republicanism	(Farnham:	Ashgate	Publishing,	2013),	121‐135,	p.	125.	
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Groot	 and	 the	 Leiden	 regent	Hendrick	 van	Willighen.	But	 Johan	de	Witt	 especially	 intervened	
substantially	by	correcting	large	parts	of	the	work.	Historical	research	has	shown	that	he	toned	









thought.248	 First	 of	 all,	 scholarship	 stresses	 the	 brothers’	 fierce	 criticism	 of	 Political	
Aristotelianism.	 De	 la	 Courts’	 writings,	 however,	 often	 employed	 Aristotelian	 traditions	 of	
structure	and	vocabulary,	and	were	part	of	the	tradition	of	politica.249	Yet,	both	brothers	did	not	
assert	natural	 sociability	or	 the	human	 faculty	of	 reason.	They	were	profoundly	 influenced	by	
the	 new	 theories	 of	 the	 passions	 that	 dominated	 Dutch	 mid‐seventeenth‐century	 philosophy	
providing	a	crucial	role	for	Descartes	Les	Passions	de	l’âme	(1649).250	De	la	Court	even	explicitly	










and	German	political	Thought,	 1580–1650,’	 in	Van	Gelderen	 and	 Skinner	 (eds.),	Republicanism:	A	Shared	European	
Heritage.	Volume	 I,	Republicanism	and	Constitutionalism	 in	Early	Modern	Europe	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	
Press,	2000)	195‐218,	p.	214;	Weststeijn,	Commercial	Republicanism,	37,	62‐65.		






Furthermore,	 the	brothers	De	 la	Court	were	 inspired	by	writings	on	reason	of	state,	as	
those	by	Guicciardini,	Botero,	Boccalini,	as	well	as	Rohan.	Throughout	their	writings,	 the	De	 la	




grandezza	 of	 cities,	 unlike	Machiavelli	 he	 favoured	 commercial	 rather	 than	military	means	 to	
this	end.254	Boccalini	similarly	argued	for	defensive	foreign	policy	to	protect	commerce,	but	he	
conveyed	his	view	on	contemporary	politics	through	a	satire	of	power‐hungry	rulers	and	their	




of	 the	bellicose	plunder	prince.	Boccalini	wrote	about	 the	 contemporary	novelty	of	Habsburg‐
Spain,	which	was	ruled	by	princes	who	were	driven	by	self‐interest	and	passions,	seeking	their	




the	 seventeenth	century	and	Elsevier	was	particularly	active	 in	 their	promotion;	but	 although	
their	 impact	 in	 England	 has	 been	 extensively	 studied,	 Rohan’s	 influence	 on	 Dutch	 political	
thought	 has	 received	 comparatively	 little	 attention.	 However,	 editions	 of	 De	 l’interest	 and	
updated	versions	by	other	authors	 flooded	 the	Dutch	book	market;258	and	 in	 the	same	year	of	
                                                            







253	 Giovanni	 Botero	On	 the	 Causes	 of	 the	Greatness	 and	Magnificence	 of	 Cities,	 1588,	 translated	 and	 introduced	 by	
Geoffrey	Symcox	(Toronto/	Buffalo/London:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2012).	
254	Hartman	and	Weststeijn,	‘An	Empire	of	Trade’,	14.	
255	 Van	 Gelderen,	 ‘Aristotelians,	 Monarchomachs	 and	 Republicans’,	 195;	 Hartman	 and	 Weststeijn,	 ‘An	 Empire	 of	
Trade’;	Velema,	‘”That	a	Republic	is	Better	than	a	Monarchy”’,	15‐16.	












Den	 tegenwoordigen	 interest	 der	 Christen	 princen	 [The	 present	 interest	 of	 princes	 of	
Christendom].		Its	headings		were	similar	but	it	was	much	shorter	than	De	l’interest,	it	reflected	




promote	 seafaring,	 commerce	 and	 fishery,	 which	 De	 la	 Court	 likewise	 argued.	 But	 secondly,	
unlike	De	la	Court’s	argument,	the	pamphlet	urged	the	formation	of	defensive	alliances	with	all	
neighbouring	polities	against	offensive	wars	and	‘other	Banditries’.259	
Moreover,	 the	 influence	 of	 contemporary	 English	 interest	 debates	 on	 contemporary	
Dutch	 analyses	 of	 the	 ‘national’	 interest	 have	 not	 been	 examined,	 although	 several	 historians	
have	 pointed	 to	 notable	 similarities,	 most	 often	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 supposed	 ‘republicanism’,	






demand	of	Rohan’s	 interest	analysis,	which	perhaps	was	brought	 forth	by	rising	publications	on	 the	 interest	of	 the	
Dutch	Republic	in	the	re‐instalment	of	the	Stuart	monarchy	in	1653.	See	in	particular:	L’interest	des	Provinces	Unies	du	
Pays	Bas	dans	 le	 restablissement	de	 sa	majeste	de	 la	Grande	Bretagne	 (1653)	 and	 its	Dutch	 translation	Hoe	 veel	de	
Vereenigde	 Provintien	 behoort	 gelegen	 te	 zijn,	 de	 her‐stellinge	 van	 den	 coninck	 van	Groot‐Britangie	 (The	 Hague:	 H.	
Cornelsz.,	 1653).	 Updated	 versions	 or	 writings	 echoing	 Rohan’s	 interest	 analysis	 were	 for	 instance:	 Den	
tegenwoordigen	 interest	 der	 Christen	 princen	 (Enkhuizen:	 Dirk	 Klaer‐Oogh,	 1662);	 Maximes	 des	 princes	 et	 estats	
souverains	 (Cologne,	 1665	 [Amsterdam:	 Daniel	 Elsevier,	 1665]),	 which	 underwent	 further	 editions	 in	 1665,	 1666,	
1667,	1670,	1676	and	1683.	
259	 It	 encompassed	 eight	 pages	 and	 did	 not	 treat	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 Swiss	 cantons	 and	 of	 the	 Italian	 ‘states’.	Den	
tegenwoordigen	 interest	 der	 Christen	 princen	 (Enkhuizen:	 Dirk	 Klaer‐Oogh,	 1662),	 quoted	 from	 p.	 8	 [‘andere	
Rooverijen’].	
260	 Jonathan	 Scott,	 England's	 Troubles	 Seventeenth‐Century	 English	 Political	 Instability	 in	 European	 (Cambridge:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	2000),	300‐301,	371‐372;	Jonathan	Scott,	Algernon	Sidney	and	the	English	Republic	1623‐
1677	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 1988),	 207‐216,	 301;	Weststeijn,	 Commercial	 Republicanism,	 352;	
Ryan	Walter,	 ‘Slingsby	Bethel's	Analysis	of	 State	 Interests’,	History	of	European	 Ideas	41:4	 (2015),	489‐506,	p.	280,	





Heritage.	Volume	 I,	Republicanism	and	Constitutionalism	 in	Early	Modern	Europe	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	
Press,	2002),	61‐81,	p.	68;	However,	Nedham	also	responded	to	Dutch	writings	on	‘interest’,	e.g.	in	The	Case	between	
England	and	the	United	Provinces	(1652)	he	countered	the	Justificatie	voor	de	vereenichende	Nederlandsten	Provincien	
that	 justified	 the	 Dutch	 refusal	 to	 ally	 with	 the	 English	 ‘rebels’	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 law	 of	 nations	 and	 interest.	 Blom,	
‘Democratic	Tendencies	in	Anglo‐Dutch	Republicanism’,	129:		










True	 Interest	 of	 1659	 are	 striking.	 Nedham	 examined	 the	 specific	 ‘interests’	 of	 the	 different	
‘domestic’	power	groups,	notably	the	royalists,	parliament	and	the	army,	and	concluded	that	it	is	






claimed	 that	 this	 emphasis	 on	 harmonization	 was	 a	 means	 of	 freeing	 interest	 from	 dynastic	
considerations,	 effectively	 delegitimizing	 Stuart	 rule.	 Royal	 government,	 argued	 Sidney	 and	
Nedham,	unbalanced	 the	constitution	by	pursuing	only	 the	 interest	of	 the	ruler.265	De	 la	Court	
likewise	argued	that	to	acquire	‘free’	government	was	to	ensure	that	rulers	and	ruled	shared	the	
same	 interests,	 as	 the	 merchant‐regents	 ruled	 mercantile	 Holland.	 These	 interest	 analyses	
facilitated	 attempts	 to	 reconstruct	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 i.e.	 government	 conceived	 under	 divine	
(natural)	 law,	 as	 Houston	 writes:	 ‘Despite	 its	 modern	 association	 with	 conflict,	 discord	 and	
struggle,	 the	 language	of	 interest	was	prized	 for	 its	ability	 to	 illuminate	new	bases	of	political	






263	 Marchamont	 Nedham,	 Interest	will	 not	 lie.	Or,	 a	 View	 of	 Englands	 True	 Interest	 in	 reference	 to	 Papist,	Royalist,	
Presbyterian,	Baptised,	Neuter,	Army,	Parliament,	City	of	London	[…]	(London	1659).		
264Sidney,	Algernon.	Court	Maxims	[manuscript	written	in	1664‐1665],	edited	with	an	introduction	by	Hans	W.	Blom,	
Eco	Haitsma	Mulier	and	Ronald	 Jansen	 (eds.)	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996);	Slingsby	Bethel,	The	
Present	Interest	of	England	Stated	(1671)	and	also	Bethel’s	The	World’s	Mistake	 in	Oliver	Cromwell	(1668);	Hartman	
and	Weststeijn	 even	conclude:	 ‘Much	more	 research	can	and	should	be	done	on	 the	de	 la	Courts’	 influence	on	 this	
Whig	economic	and	political	thought’,	in	‘An	Empire	of	Trade’,	24‐25.	








267	 To	 outline	 Nedham’s	 context,	 Blair	Worden	 writes:	 ‘Since	 1640s	 an	 epidemic	 of	 revolutions,	 from	 Portugal	 to	
Sweden,	had	produced	a	crisis	of	monarchy,	in	which	contemporaries	(Harrington	among	them)	saw	the	hand	of	God.’	
Blair	 Worden,	 ‘Marchamont	 Nedham	 and	 the	 Beginnings	 of	 English	 Republicanism’,	 in:	 David	 Wootton	 (ed.),	
Republicanism,	 Liberty,	 and	 Commercial	 Society	 (Stanford:	 Stanford	 University	 Press,	 1994),	 45‐81,	 p.	 72.	 This	










the	 Aristotelian	 notion	 of	 human	 sociability	 and	 instead	 claimed	 fear	 and	 self‐interest	 as	 the	
mechanisms	behind	the	establishment	of	political	government.	He	disputed	the	common	belief	
in	 the	 viability	 of	 a	 mixed	 constitution,	 wherein	 the	 different	 elements,	 the	 stadholder	
(monarchical),	 the	 States	 (aristocratic),	 and	 the	 sometimes	 added	 town	 councils	 (democratic)	
naturally	 balanced	 each	 other.269	 Instead,	 Boxhorn	 based	 his	 interpretation	 of	 the	 mixed	
constitution	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 self‐interest.	 Because	 stable	 government	 is	 based	 on	 the	 love	 of	
subjects	 for	 the	 ruler,	 he	 advocated	 involvement	 in	 government	by	 each	 section	 of	 society.	 In	
practice,	however,	Boxhorn	believed	administrative	offices	should	be	assigned	 to	 the	elite,	 the	
nobles	and	the	wealthy,	for	they	are	likely	to	be	more	devoted	to	the	common	good,	when	it	(and	
their	own	properties)	would	be	harmed.	In	case	of	the	Dutch	Republic,	 the	private	 interests	of	
the	 rich	 merchants	 of	 the	 province	 of	 Holland	 corresponded	 to	 the	 greatest	 extent	 to	 the	
common	 interest,	 and	 therefore	Holland’s	 form	of	 government	was	an	aristocracy.	Yet,	 due	 to	
the	rise	of	commercial	capital,	revolts	of	politically	excluded	merchants	could	be	expected	and	so	
he	 advised	 shifting	 to	 a	more	 open	 aristocratic	 government.270	Boxhorn	 echoed	Hugo	Grotius’	
argument	 about	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 principal	 assemblies	 to	 restrain	 the	 stadholder.	 Grotius	
famously	theorised	in	De	Antiquitate	Reipublicae	Batavicae	(1610)	that	since	Batavian	times	the	
States	 possessed	 the	 sovereignty,	 which	 in	 day‐to‐day	 politics	 was	 shared	with	 the	 prince	 of	
Orange	 with	 the	 States	 retaining	 the	 highest	 authority	 and	 power	 to	 command	 in	 times	 of	
disagreement.	 271	 In	 the	 literature	 Grotius’s	 ‘Batavian	 myth/model’	 is	 often	 taken	 as	 the	




Magistrates’,	 in	 David	 Armitage,	 Armand	 Himy	 and	 Quentin	 Skinner	 (eds.),	Milton	 and	Republicanism	 (Cambridge:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	1998),	82‐105,	p.	103.		
268	 His	 posthumously	 published	 Institutiones	 politicae	 (1657)	 reflect	 his	 lectures	 on	 the	 traditional	 politica	 genre	






aristocratic	 and,	 sometimes	 added,	 the	 city	 councils	 the	 democratic	 elements.	 M.	 van	 Gelderen,	 ‘Aristotelians,	
Monarchomachs	 and	 Republicans’,	 201‐204.	 However,	 Justus	 Lipsius	 described	 monarchy	 as	 the	 best	 form	 of	




expected,	 because	 the	 rich	 segment	 of	 the	 citizenry	 would	 no	 longer	 tolerate	 that	 they	 were	 excluded	 from	
government.	











upon	harmonizing	of	 the	 (self‐)interests	of	 ruled	and	 rulers.	 In	 this	way,	De	 la	Court	arguably	
contributed	 to	 the	 so‐called	 ‘crisis	of	Political	Aristotelianism’.274	But	 first	 and	 foremost,	De	 la	
Court	employed	the	vocabulary	of	reason	of	state	in	Interest	van	Holland	to	defend	the	political	






	Interest	 van	 Holland	 was	 actually	 based	 on	 an	 early	 work	 of	 the	 De	 la	 Court	 brothers,	 a	
manuscript	titled	Het	welvaren	der	stad	Leyden	[The	wellbeing	of	the	city	of	Leiden],	finished	in	
1659.275	Johan	most	probably	wrote	the	initial	text	that	Pieter	expanded	into	a	sharp	critique	of	
the	 municipal	 government	 that	 allegedly	 constrained	 the	 economic,	 religious	 and	 political	
liberties	of	the	citizens.	It	was,	however,	not	published,	but	via	his	wife’s	brother‐in	law,	Johan	
Eleman,	the	manuscript	circulated	in	the	regenten‐faction	surrounding	De	Witt.	It	found	a	keen	
audience	 amongst	 these	 powerful	 regents	 and	 so	 Pieter	 de	 la	 Court	 expanded	 the	 interest	
analysis	to	the	entire	province	of	Holland.	In	the	summer	of	Johan	de	Witt	received	a	first	draft	of	
Interest	van	Holland.276	
Het	welvaren	 der	 stad	 Leyden	 has	 been	 considered	 as	 part	 of	 the	 tradition	 of	 Italian	
ragion	di	stato	literature,	appropriating	Italian	reason	of	state	to	the	seaborne,	mercantile	Dutch	





















been	 defined	 as	 attacking	 ‘war	 despotism’.	 In	 chapter	 64,	 the	 De	 la	 Courts	 exclaim:	 ‘a	 furore	
monarcharum	 libera	 nos	 Domine’	 [Save	 us	 from	 the	 fury	 of	 monarchs,	 oh	 Lord].279	 While	 a	
monarchic	 form	of	government	has	 the	advantage	of	effective	rule,	 for	 it	concerned	one	single	
man,	 ‘no	greater	disaster	can	be	thought,	 if	a	 free	City	or	Republic	would	fall	 into	a	Monarchic	
government,	 because	 generally	 all	 sciences,	 arts,	 virtues,	 Prosperity	 and	 commerce	 would	 be	
destroyed,	 yes	 the	 inhabitants	 would	 be	 devoured	 like	 bread.’280	 Interestingly,	 the	 brothers	
underline	 the	 contemporary	 transformations	 of	 European	 governments,	 appealing	 to	 ancient	
rights	of	certain	parts	of	society	to	participate	in	politics,	as	contemporary	French	and	German	
authors	likewise	argued.		They	write:	‘In	old	times	Europe	was	ruled	satisfactorily	by	Republics,	




la	 Courts	 write,	 follow	 the	 examples	 of	 ‘Tartars,	 Turks,	 Persians,	 Muscovites,	 and	 all	 other	
countries,	 where	 a	 person	without	 any	 contradiction	 rules	 and	 is	 obeyed’.282	Without	 further	
explanation	 they	 assert	 that	 ‘Spain,	 France,	 Sweden,	 the	 German	 rulers	 and	 the	 Netherlands’	
transformed	 into	 such	 illegitimate	 systems	 of	 rule,	 and	 instead	 concentrate	 on	 showing	 ‘how	
disadvantageous	the	slavery	or	coercion	of	the	same	[absolute	general	freedom	of	inhabitants]	
for	the	rulers	of	Leiden	is.’283		
Here	we	witness	the	nature	of	 the	De	 la	Courts’	argument,	 in	their	attack	on,	allegedly,	
new	 practices	 of	 rulers.	 They	 make	 the	 standard	 comparison	 with	 Oriental	 regimes	 deemed	
despotic.	Like	the	Orientals,	the	rulers	of	Christendom	coerce	and	subvert	the	rule	of	law,	they	




of	 Spain,	 the	 De	 la	 Courts	 treated	 newness	 prejudicially.	 Indeed,	 the	 negativity	 surrounding	
innovation	 was	 entirely	 conventional,	 yet	 has	 been	 overlooked	 by	 modern	 commentators	 in	
their	 search	 for	 republicanism;	 the	 result	 has	 been	 a	misplaced	 emphasis:	 it	 is	 not	 that	 new	














De	 la	 Court’s	 severe	 criticism	 of	 certain	 corrupt	 practices	 of	 princes,	 in	 Interest	 van	Holland	
essentially	 entailed	 anti‐Orangism.	 It	 reflected	 a	 long‐term	 constitutional	 crisis	 of	 the	
stadholderate	in	the	Dutch	republic,	which	usually	erupted	under	foreign	political	pressures.284	
The	stadholderate	was	created	by	Emperor	Charles	V	to	replace	the	absent	Habsburg	ruler	and	
retained	 by	 the	 Union	 of	 Utrecht	 from	 1579	 onwards.285	 This	 office	 comprised	 a	 hybrid	
collection	of	powers,	privileges	and	informal	influences.	Since	in	practice	the	princes	of	Orange	
successively	occupied	the	office,	the	stadholderate	was	also	a	dynastic	institution.	The	provincial	
estates	 chose	 the	 stadholder	 independently	 from	 each	 other.	 The	 States	 General	 awarded	 the	
stadholder	with	 the	highest	military	office	of	captain‐general	 in	 the	context	of	 the	war	against	
Spain.	 Formally,	 the	 stadholderate	 was	 a	 civil	 office,	 which	 had	 developed	 de	 facto	 into	 an	
important	military	one.286	Rowen	calls	the	stadholderate	therefore	‘an	improvisation’	and	states	
that	 ‘it	 was	 difficult	 for	 contemporaries	 to	 fit	 it	 into	 the	 standard	 categories	 of	 political	
analysis’.287	
The	 joint	 Orange‐office	 of	 stadholder	 and	 captain‐general	 proved	 to	 be	 a	 danger	 for	 the	
States	 of	 Holland	 in	 the	 crisis	 years	 of	 1618	 and	 1650,	 when	 respectively	 the	 Stadholders	
Maurice	 and	William	 II	 of	 Orange	 pressured	 successfully	 the	 provincial	 assembly	 by	military	
force.	During	religious	disputes	in	1610s,	a	conflict	rose	between	the	States	of	Holland	and	the	
States	General	about	the	legal	power	to	organize	military	forces	to	quell	internal	religious	riots.	
On	 the	authority	of	 the	States	General,	 Stadholder	Maurice	pressured	 the	States	of	Holland	by	
military	force	and	arrested	the	Grand	Pensionary	of	Holland,	Johan	van	Oldenbarnevelt,	in	1618,	
who	was	tried	and	executed	in	1619.	In	1650,	Maurice’s	nephew,	Stadholder	William	II	and	the	
States	 of	 Holland	 were	 involved	 in	 a	 conflict	 about	 reduction	 of	 the	 army,	 which	 resulted	 in	
William’s	attempt	to	take	over	the	city	of	Amsterdam	by	force	and	the	arrest	of	eight	members	of	
                                                            
284	Klashorst,	 “Metten	 schijn	van	monarchie	 getempert”,	 99;	Rowen	 stated	 that	 from	 the	1650s	until	 the	 fall	 of	 the	
Dutch	Republic	 in	1759,	 ‘the	central	constitutional	question	became	the	stadholdership,	 its	desirability	and	 its	very	
existence.	 It	 was	 not	 whether	 the	 country	 should	 be	 a	 republic	 or	 a	 monarchy,	 as	 in	 nineteenth‐century	 France.’	




285	 Actually	 Charles	 V	 installed	 three	 stadholders	 corresponding	 to	 the	 three	 administrative	 parts	 of	 the	 northern	
Netherlands	in	1543.	According	to	Jonathan	Israel,	the	Union	of	Utrecht	extended	the	powers	of	the	stadholderate	for	
it	was	decided	 that	he	must	 take	up	 the	mediator	position	between	provinces	 in	 the	 absence	of	 a	 king.	 Israel,	The	
Dutch	Republic,	301;	For	further	information	on	the	Union	of	Utrecht	read	Johan	Christiaan	Boogman,	 ‘The	Union	of	
Utrecht:	its	Genesis	and	Consequences’,	BMGN	–	Low	Countries	Historical	Review	94:3	(1997),		377‐407.	






the	 provincial	 assembly	 of	 Holland.288	 His	 premature	 death,	 however,	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 the	
stadholderless	regime.	
Rohan	considered	that	it	was	Maurice’s	particular	interest	to	pursue	continuous	warfare.289	
Interestingly,	 the	 princes	 of	 Orange	 themselves	 even	 argued	 that	 their	 aspirations	 benefitted	
from	a	strong	army	and	an	Orange‐military	command,	as	their	most	important	power	play	was	
participating	in	the	European	wars.	In	1674	Stadholder	William	III	told	the	ambassador	Gabriel	
Sylvius	 that	 ‘He	was	 right	 and	 it	was	 in	his	 interest	 (…)	 to	 favour	 the	pursuit	 of	war	 in	order	
thereby	to	establish	his	authority.’290	After	the	meltdown	of	the	stadholderless	regime	in	1672,	
he	was	offered	a	range	of	noble	titles	but	he	constantly	declined.	According	to	Charles‐Édouard	
Levillain,	 he	 preferred	 to	 stretch	 the	 stadholderate	 to	 its	 full	 capacity;	 ‘Better	 a	warrior	 king	
without	 a	 kingdom	 than	 a	warrior	 king	without	 an	 army.’291	 His	 father,	William	 II	 of	 Orange,	
however,	 had	 severely	 overstretched	 the	 legitimate	 scope	 of	 the	 stadholderate	 in	 1650.	 The	
peace	 with	 Spain	 was	 an	 utmost	 nuisance	 for	William	 II	 as	 he	 tellingly	 wrote	 to	 the	 French	
ambassador	 d’Estrades:	 ‘I	wish	 that	 I	 could	 break	 the	 necks	 of	 all	 the	 villains	 that	 signed	 the	
peace.’	292	He	stressed	the	importance	of	warfare	for	the	Dutch	nobility	and	the	utter	egoism	of	
Holland	merchant‐regents:	 ‘The	Merchants	 never	 think	 of	 anything	 other	 than	 commerce	 and	
how	 to	promote	 it,	 they	do	not	 look	out	 for	 the	 rest	of	 the	 country	and	 the	Nobility.’293	Leslie	
Price	argues	that	William	II	had	acted	rather	rashly	from	sheer	frustration	at	Holland’s	attempts	
to	 limit	 the	number	of	his	 troops.294	The	stadholderless	 regime	built	on	 the	 recent	memory	of	













290	Quoted	 from	Charles	Édouard	Levillain,	 ‘William	III’s	Military	and	Political	Career	 in	Neo‐roman	Context,	1672–
1702,’	The	Historical	Journal	48:2	(2005),	213–350,	p.	322.	
291	Levillain,	‘William	III’s	Military	and	Politically	Career’,	327	and	333.	
292	 Roeland	 Harms,	 De	 uitvinding	 van	 de	 publieke	 opinie:	 pamfletten	 als	 massamedia	 in	 de	 zeventiende	 eeuw	
(Amsterdam:	Amsterdam	University	Press,	2011),	92:	 ‘Ik	wou	dat	ik	allen	schurken,	die	den	vrede	gesloten	hebben,	
den	nek	laten	breken.’		
293	 Harms,	De	uitvinding	 van	de	publieke	opinie,	92;	 ‘De	 Coopluyden	 denkcen	 nievers	 op	 als	 op	 de	 trafyc	 en	 die	 te	
beneficieren,	voor	de	rest	van	het	landt	en	den	Adel	daer	sijnse	[zien	ze,	Roeland	Harms]niet	naer	om.’	
294	 The	 States	 of	 Holland	 only	 overstretched	 its	 authority	when	 they	paid	 off	 troops	 assigned	 to	 them	 in	 order	 to	











The	republican	regime	of	 Johan	de	Witt	 felt	no	 less	obliged	to	participate	 in	the	wars	between	
European	 rulers.	 During	 the	 1650s	 the	 Dutch	 Republic	 fought	 the	 English	 in	 1652‐1654,	
intervened	in	the	Baltic	area	against	Sweden	and	England	in	1656‐1659,	planned	to	intervene	in	
Münsterland	in	1657	and	pursued	warfare	against	Portugal	in	1657‐1660.296	During	the	1660s,	
apart	 from	tensions	with	England	 leading	up	to	 the	Second	Anglo‐Dutch	War	(1665‐1667),	De	
Witt’s	main	 concern	 regarding	 foreign	 affairs	was	 to	 keep	 a	 safe	 distance	 from	 the	 ascending	
French	monarchy.	Shortly	after	the	Peace	of	Pyrenees	in	1659,	Spain	halved	the	size	of	its	army	
in	 the	 Spanish	 Netherlands,	 leaving	 the	 south	 of	 the	 Dutch	 Union	 vulnerable	 to	 a	 potential	
French	 invasion.	 Nonetheless,	many	 Dutch	 regents	 shared	 scepticism	 about	 the	 usefulness	 of	
Spain	as	an	ally	against	France	and	viewed	the	latter	as	a	profitable	business	partner.297	In	1662	
a	 Franco‐Dutch	 defensive	 alliance	was	 signed.	 A	 famous	Dutch	 slogan	was:	 ‘Gallia	 amica,	 non	
vicina’	[rather	France	as	friend,	than	neighbour].298	
War	 related	 burdens	 brought	 great	 pressure	 to	 the	 Dutch	 inhabitants	 during	 the	
stadholderless	 regime.	 After	 the	 peace	 of	 1648,	 Dutch	 war	 expenses	 fell	 drastically,	 but	 rose	
again	due	to	the	naval	 intervention	in	the	Baltic	 in	1658	and	peaked	during	the	Second	Anglo‐
Dutch	War	 (over	30	million	 guilders	 in	1665	 compared	 to	22	million	 guilders	 annually	 in	 the	
1630s).	 Moreover,	 after	 1648	 debt	 charges,	 especially	 Holland’s,	 rose,	 even	 though	 De	 Witt	
managed	to	lower	them	in	the	beginning	of	the	1650s	until	Dutch	warfare	increased	at	the	end	of	
the	 decade.299	 The	 subsequent	 rise	 in	 taxation,	 sale	 of	 loans,	 annuities	 and	 new	 short‐term	
obligations	produced	a	mounting	discontent	amongst	Dutch	inhabitants.300		
Scholars	have	stressed	the	existence	of	a	Dutch	 ‘discussion	culture’	that	could	mobilise	the	
population,	 largely	 through	 pamphlets.301	 Gert	 Klashorst	 remarks	 that	 particularly	 during	 the	
epoch	of	 ‘True	Freedom’	(1650‐1672)	pamphlet	debates	raged	outside	governmental	bodies	in	
























Thus,	 the	 stadholderless	 regime	 was	 stuck	 between	 intensified	 European	 warfare	 and	





Against	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 princes	 of	 Orange	 were	 driven	 by	 self‐interest	 to	 harm	 the	 ‘true	
interest’,	 many	 defenders	 of	 the	 stadholderate	 argued	 that	 in	 the	 ‘mixed	 constitution’	 the	
passion	and	self‐interest	were	subordinated	to	the	common	interest	by	the	balancing	dynamics	




















1648’,	 89.	 Blom	 points	 especially	 to	Munsters	Praetie:	Deliberant	Dum	 fingere	nesciunt	 (1646)	 in	which	 the	 use	 of	






pamphlet	 as	 part	 of	 ‘critical‐current	 affairs’	 genre	 see:	 Staet	 representerende	 de	 generale	 affairen,	 midstgaders	
d’hoedanicheden	 ende	 gestalenis	 van	 alle	 koninckrijcken,	 prinsdommen	 ende	 republiquen	 van	 Europa.	 Vanden	 Jaren	
1654.	Tot	den	 jaere	1655	(The	Hague,	1655);	Notably,	 the	 influence	of	 the	1648‐negotitations	should	be	researched	








authors	 of	 different	 factions	 to	 state	 their	 respective	 claims.308	 Klashorst	 examined	 a	 diverse	





official	 papers	 argued	 for	 an	 absolute	 provincial	 sovereignty	 that	 chiefly	 entailed	 the	 right	 to	
refuse	any	financial	request	from	other	parties.	Moreover,	Klashorst	suggests	that	the	term	‘free	
republic’	in	Holland’s	official	papers,	primarily	meant	freedom	from	interference	of	the	House	of	









1654);	Already	during	 the	 first	Anglo‐Dutch	War	 (1652‐1654),	 but	 especially	 after	 the	publication	 of	De	 la	 Court’s	
Interest	of	Holland	in	1662	and	the	French	invasion	in	1672,	an	explosive	rise	of	Dutch	publications	with	‘interest’	in	
their	 titles	 is	 detectable,	 used	 in	 political	 and	 religious	 issues.	 See	 for	 instance:	Hoe	 veel	 de	Vereenigde	Provintien	
behoort	gelegen	te	zijn,	de	her‐stellinge	van	den	coninck	van	Groot‐Britangie	(The	Hague:	H.	Cornelsz.,	1653);	Hollands	
Op‐Komst,	 of	 Bedenkingen	 op	 de	 schaadelyke	 Schriften,	 genaamt	 Grafelyke	 Regeeringe	 en	 Interest	 van	 Holland	 uit‐
gegeven	door	V.D.H.	ten	dienste	van	alle	liefhebers	die	het	ware	Interest	van	Holland	beminnen	(Leiden,	1662);	I.N.D.P.	
[Jean	Nicholss	 de	 Parival],	Ware	 interest	 van	Holland;	gebouwd	 op	de	 ruïnen	 van	den	 Interest	 van	Holland,	 onlangs	
uitgegeven	door	D.V.H.	(Leiden:	Jan	Princen,	1662);	Den	tegenwoordigen	interest	der	Christen	princen	(Enkhuizen:	Dirk	
Klaer‐Oogh,	 1662);	 Johan	 Corbet,	Het	 interest	 van	Engelandt,	 in	 de	materie	 van	 religie	 (Amsterdam:	 Steven	 Swart,	
1663);	 Gelasius	 Mullens	 [Guilielmus	 Saldenus],	Neerlands	 interest,	 tot	 vrede	 der	 kercke,	 en	wegh‐neminge	 van	 alle	
opkomende	misverstanden	in	de	selve	(Middelburg:	Yemant	Hendricksz.,	1664);	L’interest	de	l’Allemagne,	en	general	et	
en	particvlier	 (	Cologne:	Pierre	Marteau,	1668	 [printed	 in	 the	Netherlands	by	Weller]);	 	Willem	Guthry,	Het	groote	
interest	 van	 een	 christen;	 ofte	Het	 deel	 van	 een	 geloovige	 getoetst	 […]	wie	 heeft	 ende	 hoe	 te	 krijghen,	 […]	 En	 in	 ‘t	
Nederlandts	 vertaaldt	door	 Jacobus	Koelman	 (Vlissingen;	 Abraham	van	 Laren,	 1669);	David	Montanus,	Stemme	des	
gejuygs	 en	des	heils	over’t	groote	 interest	 van	 een	 christen	 […]	 in	gezangen	 vervat	 (Vlissingen:	 Abraham	van	 Laren,	
1672);	Holland’s	 interest,	 gestelt	 tegen	 dat	 van	 Jan	 de	Witt;	 voor‐gevallen	 tusschen	Hans,	 raedts‐heer,	 en	Arent,	 een	
borger	 (1672);	 Engelands	 interest,	 ofte	 tegenwoordich	 waerachtig	 belangh.	 By	 een	 trouwhertigh	 lief‐hebber	 van	
Engelands	 eere	 desselfs	 en	 gantsch	 christen‐rijcks	 vrede,	 uit	 D’Engelsche	 spraeck	 in	 de	 Neder‐duytsche	 overgeset	
[Translated	 from	 English]	 (1672);	 Discoursen	 over	 den	 tegenwoordigen	 interest	 van	 het	 landt.	 Tusschen	 een	 Zeeu,	
Hollander	en	raedsheer	(Amsterdam,	1672);	[Joseph	Hill],	The	interest	of	these	United	Provinces.	Being	a	defence	of	the	
Zeelander	 choice.	By	a	wellwisher	of	 the	 reformed	 religion,	and	 the	wellfare	of	 these	 countries	 (Middelburg:	 Thomas	
Berry,	1672);	De	schoolen	der	prince,	en	interest	der	voornaemste	potentate	des	werelts	(Cologne,	H.	Albedeuyt,	1673).	




310	 Ida	 Nijenhuis	writes,	 ‘civil	 liberty	 –the	 rule	 of	 law‐	 became	 an	 essential	 feature	 of	 commercial	 society’	 for	 the	
simple	reason	that	trade	needed	the	basic	judicial	protection	of	property	and	person.	‘Republican	liberty’	in	this	sense,	
promoted	‘wealth	and	numbers’.	Ida	Nijenhuis,	“Shining	Comet,	Falling	Meteor”.	Reflections	on	the	Dutch	republic	as	a	
